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ABSTRACT 
The insurance industry manages a large amount of financial assets. In recent years, a 
growing number of investment companies are providing insurance asset management solutions, 
and the use of external asset management by the insurance industry is increasing over time. 
Therefore, understanding insurance asset management is important for academics and 
practitioners in both insurance and general finance.  
In the first essay, we investigate industrial portfolio tilt (referred to as “industry bias”) in 
the U.S. property liability insurers’ common stock portfolios. We find that U.S. property-liability 
insurers exhibit a negative industry bias by tilting their portfolios away from their own industry. 
We examine the nature of the industry bias and find that property-liability insurers have 
asymmetric information in investing in industrially close stocks but that their underwriting risk 
drives their portfolio tilt away from these stocks. Therefore, the property-liability insurers’ 
negative industry bias is driven by hedging in spite of information advantages. 
In the second essay, we investigate the betting-against-beta strategy in the presence of 
leverage in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry and empirically test whether these 
institutional investors’ leverage is an important determinant of their portfolio beta choice. 
Through empirical analysis, we find that property-liability insurers’ portfolio beta is not 
negatively related to their leverage, implying that these institutional investors do not bet against 
beta. In addition, we explore its explanation using a holdings-based calendar-time portfolio 
approach and find that these institutional investors’ low-beta portfolio does not outperform their 
high-beta portfolio. Overall, our results suggest that betting-against-beta strategy does not exist. 
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In the third essay, we investigate the relation between cash holdings and market 
concentration in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. We leverage the highly 
disaggregated nature of insurer statutory data to construct a refined market concentration 
measure, market space weighted concentration, which more accurately reflects an insurer’s state-
line market space. Through our empirical analysis, we provide evidence in support of the 
predation risk theory. Specifically, insurers exposed to higher market concentration tend to hold 
more cash, and their cash is used to support future growth by reducing predation risk. 
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ESSAY I 
PORTFOLIO CHOICE: FAMILIARITY, HEDGING, AND INDUSTRY BIAS 
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INTRODUCTION 
The basic assumptions of the capital asset pricing theory imply that investors should hold 
well-diversified portfolios (e.g., Blume and Friend, 1975). However, a vast literature has 
documented that investors underdiversify and tilt their portfolios toward certain assets 1. This 
portfolio tilt is generally referred to as a portfolio bias. For example, a well-known portfolio bias 
is “local bias” (or “home bias”), which implies that investors have a preference for local 
companies’ stocks. Aside from local bias, previous studies also show that in the presence of non-
financial income, investors tend to overweigh stocks to which they are industrially close (e.g., 
Massa and Simonov, 2006; Døskeland and Hvide, 2011)2. This portfolio bias is named “industry 
bias” (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009). Prior literature proposes competing theories in 
predicting the direction of the industry bias and provides mixed evidence for the driving force of 
the industry bias. In this study, we examine the direction and nature of industry bias in the 
common stock portfolios of U.S. Property-Liability (PL) insurers, who have considerable non-
financial income and are also exposed to substantial non-financial income risk. 
Massa and Simonov (2006) propose two competing theories regarding the different 
directions of the industry bias: the familiarity-based theory and the hedging-based theory. In 
terms of the familiarity-based theory, it argues that investors prefer stocks that they are familiar 
                                                 
1 See Blume and Friend (1975), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Barber and Odean (2000), Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001), Ivković and Weisbenner (2005), Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007), Lee, Liu, and Zhu (2008), Seasholes 
and Zhu (2010), Keloharju, Knüpfer, and Linnainmaa (2012), Keloharju, Knüpfer, and Linnainmaa (2012), and Von 
Gaudecker (2015). 
2 For individual investors, Massa and Simonov (2006) call industrially close stocks “professionally close stocks”, 
and Døskeland and Hvide (2011) also call them “expertise stocks”. 
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with, implying that in the presence of non-financial income, investors should tilt toward 
industrially close stocks. Given that the portfolio bias is widely quantified by the deviations from 
the market portfolio (i.e., the difference between the portfolio weight and the market weight) in 
the literature3, a portfolio tilt toward industrially close stocks implies a positive industry bias. 
Massa and Simonov (2006) also distinguish between two types of familiarity, information-based 
familiarity (which is due to asymmetric information) and pure familiarity (which is due to 
behavioral bias). In contrast to the familiarity-based theory, the hedging-based theory is based on 
investors’ motive for hedging their non-financial income risk. It posits that investors should tilt 
their portfolios toward assets with a negative correlation with their non-financial income and 
away from the assets with a positive correlation. In addition, the higher the risk of the non-
financial income, the more investors will hedge. Massa and Simonov (2006) show that the 
correlation between investors’ non-financial income and financial income increases with the 
industrial proximity. Therefore, the hedging-based theory suggests that investors should tilt away 
from the industrially close stocks, implying that the industry bias should be negative. 
There is a paucity of empirical studies on industry bias in the literature. One important 
reason is that this research requires data of both investors’ investment portfolio and their non-
financial income. Massa and Simonov (2006) test their theories using Swedish individual 
investors’ data 4. They show that individual investors do not hedge but deliberately tilt their 
portfolios toward stocks that are close to their industry, indicating a positive industry bias. So 
they find evidence in support of the familiarity-based theory. Massa and Simonov (2006) also 
explore the nature of familiarity and find evidence that the familiarity is driven by information. 
They show that the familiarity differs across investors with different degrees of informativeness 
                                                 
3 See Seasholes and Zhu (2010), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), and Døskeland and Hvide (2011). 
4 The data ocover detailed information on individual investors’ holdings and their different sources of income, 
demographics, and family characteristics. 
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(which is represented by investors’ wealth) and high wealth investors make more profits than 
low wealth investors. Additionally, they find that familiarity changes following a shock in 
investors’ industrial proximity to the stocks. Specifically, when an investor has changed the 
industry in which he (she) is employed or has been unemployed recently, the investor’s holdings 
will be less subject to an industry bias. 
Døskeland and Hvide (2011) also investigate the existence and implications of the 
industry bias. Specifically, they use Norwegian individual investors as their research setting5. 
Consistent with Massa and Simonov (2006), they also report a positive industry bias, which 
supports the familiarly-based theory. However, they adopt a different approach to examine the 
nature of the familiarity. They argue that the information-based familiarity is expected to 
generate abnormal returns, while the pure familiarity is not. So they form transactions-based 
calendar-time portfolios to explore the information content in individual investors’ investments 
in the close industries. They find that the abnormal returns from investing in industrially close 
stocks are negative, in many cases statistically significant. Therefore, Døskeland and Hvide 
(2011) argue that the positive industry bias is driven by a behavioral bias rather than asymmetric 
information. 
While prior literature on individual investors supports the familiarity-based theory, the 
driving force of the familiarity remains inconclusive. In addition, investors that have non-
financial income consist of not only individual investors but also institutional investors such as 
insurers and commercial banks. Since these institutional investors are exposed to substantial non-
financial income risk and they are more sophisticated than individual investors, institutional 
investors’ investment portfolios are a better setting to test the theories. In the presence of non-
                                                 
5 Døskeland and Hvide (2011) employ the data that cover the common stock holdings and transactions of all 
Norwegian individual investors at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) and supplement these investment data with 
information on sociodemographic characteristics of each investor obtained from the government statistical agency. 
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financial income, do institutional investors’ portfolios also exhibit an industry bias? If so, is the 
industry bias driven by familiarity or hedging? If the industry bias is driven by familiarity, is the 
familiarity due to asymmetric information or a behavioral bias? If the industry bias is driven by 
hedging, is the degree of hedging closely related to their non-financial income risk?  
To answer these questions, we leverage the unique reporting requirements of firms in the 
U.S. Property-Liability (PL) insurance industry and use the common stock portfolios of PL 
insurers as our research setting. In this study, we classify the stocks in PL insurers’ industry (i.e., 
PL insurance industry) as their industrially close stocks. Through empirical analysis, we find 
evidence for both the familiarity-based theory and the hedging-based theory. Specifically, we 
find that PL insurers exhibit a negative industry bias by tilting their common stock portfolios 
away from their industry. Using a transactions-based calendar-time portfolio approach, we find 
that PL insurers have information advantages in investing in industrially close stocks, supporting 
the information-based familiarity. We also show that their non-financial income risk (i.e., 
underwriting risk) leads to a portfolio tilt away from their industry, providing direct evidence in 
support of the hedging motive. Therefore, we conclude that PL insurers’ hedging motive 
dominates familiarity in their portfolio allocation, even though they possess asymmetric 
information in the PL insurance industry.  
The common stock portfolios of PL insurers are an ideal empirical setting to examine the 
investors’ industry bias for the following reasons. First, both underwriting and investing are 
important considerations in insurers’ operations. Since underwriting provides non-financial 
income for insurers to invest, the characteristics of underwriting can influence their portfolio 
choice. For example, Che and Liebenberg (2017) find that the more diversified an insurer’s 
underwriting business, the more risky assets it will take in its investment portfolio. Therefore, the 
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existence of underwriting activities satisfies the fundamental requirement (i.e., the presence of 
non-financial income) to test the theories of Massa and Simonov (2006). Second, the regulatory 
reporting requirements for insurance firms provide us with rich financial and investment data. 
Specifically, all licensed insurers are required to file their statutory statements on an annual basis. 
Similar to the 10-Ks filed by public firms in the unregulated industries, insurers’ annual statutory 
statements report financial information on assets, liabilities, income, expenses, cash flows, etc., 
by which we are able to accurately measure their firm characteristics and more importantly, 
quantify their non-financial income risk. In addition, insurers are required to disclose highly 
detailed and disaggregated information on their investments. For example, Schedule D in 
insurers’ annual statutory statements report insurers’ common stock holdings at year end and 
transactions on each day. Third, we choose to study PL insurers rather than other regulated 
financial institutions that also earn non-financial income because PL insurers have substantial 
investments in common stocks. According to the Insurance Fact Book 2017 published by the 
Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I.) (2017), PL insurers’ common stock portfolio ($326.2 
billion) represents 21.30 percent of their total investments ($1.5 trillion) in 2015. By contrast, 
Life-Health (LH) insurers’ and commercial banks’ investment in common stocks is much 
smaller6.  
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we find empirical evidence that 
hedging plays an important role in shaping the industry bias. To our knowledge, our study is the 
first in the literature that provides evidence in support of the hedging-based theory. Second, we 
confirm the information advantage of investors in investing in their own industry. Our study is 
                                                 
6 As is reported by Insurance Fact Book 2017, LH insurers’ common stock portfolio ($75.2 billion) accounts for just 
2.03 percent of their total investments ($3.7 trillion) in 2015.  According to the Financial Services Fact Book 2013 
published jointly by the I.I.I. and the Financial Services Roundtable (FSR) (2013), commercial banks’ equity 
securities ($12.9 billion) represent 0.51 percent of all securities held in their investment portfolios ($2.54 trillion) in 
2011. 
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also the first in the literature that supports the information-based familiarity from the perspective 
of abnormal returns. 
The remainder of this study is as follows. The “Literature Review” summarizes the prior 
literature. The “Hypotheses Development” section presents the hypotheses that we test in this 
study. Next, the “Empirical Method” section discusses the methods that we employ in the 
following empirical analysis. The “Industry Bias” section reports the results from the 
examination of the industry bias. The “Investigation on Familiarity” section presents the results 
from the analysis of the nature of the familiarity. Then the “Investigation on Hedging” section 
reports the results from the test of the hedging-based hypothesis. Last, the “Conclusion” section 
concludes our study. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
Prior literature has widely investigated suboptimal portfolio structure, more commonly 
referred to as underdiversification. Blume and Friend (1975) conduct the seminal work on this 
research. They find that a large number of households do not hold the market portfolio of risky 
assets in conjunction with risk-free assets and that their portfolios are poorly diversified. Blume 
and Friend (1975) argue that the possible cause of portfolio underdiversification is the 
heterogeneity of investors’ expectations. Barber and Odean (2000) examine the common stock 
investments of households at a large discount brokerage. They show that households tilt their 
portfolios toward small value stocks with high market risk and that the net performance is poor. 
They suggest that the underperformance can be explained by overconfidence. Von Gaudecker 
(2015) investigates the portfolio diversification and performance of Dutch households. He 
employs the return loss 7 as the diversification measure and finds that the large losses from 
underdiversification are incurred by those investors who neither turn to external help nor have 
good skills. His study suggests that the underdiversification reflects investment mistakes rather 
than optimal strategies. Aside from the general underdiversification, a stream of literature 
examines some specific portfolio biases. 
One important type of portfolio bias is local bias, which means that investors have a 
preference for local stocks. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) examine whether local bias in 
international investment portfolios is caused by the motive to hedge inflation risk. They find that
                                                 
7 The return loss refers to “the difference between the maximum expected return attainable at a given standard 
deviation and the actual expected return for a particular portfolio” (Von Gaudecker, 2015, page 490). 
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the local bias cannot be explained by inflation hedging unless investors have low levels of risk 
aversion and equity returns are negatively related to domestic inflation. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) document that Finnish investors exhibit a preference for nearby firms and for same-
language and same-culture firms. They also show that the marginal effect of distance is less for 
nationally known companies, for long distances, and for diversified investors. Ivković and 
Weisbenner (2005) investigate whether the local bias is driven by asymmetric information and 
find that the local holdings outperform nonlocal holdings, implying that investors are able to 
process locally available information to earn excess returns. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) also test 
whether individual investors have asymmetric information about local stocks, but they use a 
different method that addresses four pitfalls arising from studying individuals’ portfolios. They 
show that local holdings do not generate abnormal returns and the purchases of local stocks 
underperform the sales of local stocks, implying that individuals do not have value-relevant 
information about local stocks. 
Prior literature has also presented other types of portfolio bias. For example, Lee, Liu, 
and Zhu (2008) document a portfolio bias toward the stocks of investors’ employers. They show 
that this portfolio bias incurs significant economic costs. Their study suggests that the behavioral 
bias is the possible cause. Keloharju, Knüpfer, and Linnainmaa (2012) examine whether 
individuals’ product market choices influence their investment decisions. They find that 
investors are more likely to purchase and less likely to sell the shares of firms that they buy 
products from and the customer relation is positively related to the ownership stake. 
While the portfolio bias is widely documented in the finance literature, limited studies 
have paid attention to the industry bias, and the driver of the industry bias remains inconclusive. 
10 
 
We discuss the two studies on the industry bias while developing our hypotheses in the following 
section. 
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
Massa and Simonov (2006) propose two theories that explain industry bias – familiarity 
and hedging. While these theories are competing, they are not mutually exclusive and may both 
play a role in shaping overall industry bias. The familiarity-based theory posits that investors 
prefer industrially close stocks due to familiarity, leading to a positive industry bias. Consistent 
with this theory, Massa and Simonov (2006) find empirical evidence that Swedish individual 
investors deliberately tilt their portfolios toward industrially close stocks. Using the percentage 
of the market portfolio in an industry as the benchmark, Døskeland and Hvide (2011) also show 
that Norwegian individual investors overweight industrially close stocks in their portfolios. 
Therefore, in our setting of PL insurers, if the familiarity-based theory holds, we would expect 
that PL insurers tilt their common stock portfolios toward industrially close stocks (i.e., stocks of 
Property-Liability insurers), implying a positive industry bias. This hypothesis is described as 
follows, 
 
H1 (Familiarity-Based Hypothesis): PL insurers tilt their portfolios toward industrially 
close stocks. 
 
Massa and Simonov (2006) decompose familiarity into two different types, each of them 
with distinct implications. One type of familiarity is driven by asymmetric information. That is, 
investors have limited awareness or knowledge of all stocks, and information about a particular 
12 
 
stock induces investors to invest more in it. They name this type of familiarity information-based 
familiarity. In the setting of industrial portfolio allocation, investors have a preference for 
industrially close stocks because industrial proximity provides an inexpensive route through 
which investors have a comparative advantage in collecting information (Døskeland and Hvide, 
2011). Døskeland and Hvide (2011) also argue that if the familiarity is driven by asymmetric 
information, one would expect that investors who tilt their portfolios toward industrially close 
stocks earn abnormally high returns. In our study, if the familiarity is attributable to the 
asymmetric information, we would expect that PL insurers earn positive abnormal returns on 
their industrially close stocks. We summarize this hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1.1 (Information-Based Familiarity Hypothesis): PL insurers earn positive abnormal 
returns on their investment in industrially close stocks. 
 
The other type of familiarity is driven by a behavioral bias. Massa and Simonov (2006) 
refer to this familiarity as pure familiarity. They argue that this behavioral bias is caused by the 
saliency or availability of information. Specifically, investors erroneously rely on salient or often 
mentioned information rather than value-relevant information that is blended in the background. 
Døskeland and Hvide (2011) also consider overconfidence another source of behavioral bias. 
They argue that overconfident investors overestimate the precision of their information about 
future returns of securities, and this miscalibration causes heterogeneity in investors’ opinions, 
which induces them to trade (Odean, 1998). In contrast to the information-based familiarity, the 
pure familiarity is not expected to generate abnormal returns. In our setting, if the familiarity is 
13 
 
attributable to the behavioral bias, we would expect that PL insurers do not earn abnormal 
returns on their industrially close stocks. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1.2 (Pure Familiarity Hypothesis): PL insurers do not earn abnormal returns on their 
investment in industrially close stocks. 
 
An alternative to the familiarity-based theory of the industry bias is the hedging-based 
theory. Massa and Simonov (2006) argue that in the presence of non-financial income, investors 
should hedge their non-financial income risk by tilting their portfolios toward assets with a 
negative correlation with their non-financial income and away from the assets with a positive 
correlation. They also show that the correlation between investors’ non-financial income and 
financial income increases with the industrial proximity. Therefore, contrary to the familiarity-
based theory, if investors’ hedging motive dominates, they will tilt their portfolios away from the 
industrially close stocks, leading to a negative industry bias. In our setting of PL insurers, this 
hypothesis is summarized as follows: 
 
H2 (Hedging-Based Hypothesis): PL insurers tilt their portfolios away from industrially 
close stocks. 
 
Additionally, Massa and Simonov (2006) posit that the tilt in the risk profile should be 
positively related to the non-financial income risk. In other words, the higher the risk of the non-
financial income, the more investors will hedge. For PL insurers, their non-financial income risk 
is the underwriting risk. So if the hedging-based theory holds, their portfolio tilt away from the 
14 
 
industrially close stocks should increase as the underwriting risk increases. We propose this 
hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2.1 (Hedging-Risk Hypothesis): PL insurers’ portfolio tilt away from industrially close 
stocks is driven by their underwriting risk. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Industry Bias Measure 
To test the familiarity-based hypothesis and hedging-based hypothesis, we need to 
identify the industry bias regarding the industrially close stocks in PL insurers’ portfolios. PL 
insurers have their clearly defined SIC code at the four-digit level (i.e., 6331) (e.g., Ke, Petroni, 
and Safieddine, 1999) 8 . Therefore, we classify the stocks in the PL insurance industry as 
industrially close stocks for PL insurers. The portfolio bias has been investigated by many 
studies. The most widely used measure is the excess weight on the certain stocks that investors 
tilt their portfolios toward (e.g., Seasholes and Zhu, 2010; Døskeland and Hvide, 2011). 
Following Seasholes and Zhu (2010), we also scale the excess weight by the percentage of the 
market portfolio in these stocks. So our measure of the industry bias (IB) is calculated as follows, 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚
𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚
                                                                (1) 
where wp represents the percentage of a PL insurer’s portfolio in the PL insurance 
industry and wm represents the percentage of the market portfolio in the PL insurance industry9. 
                                                 
8 The Fama-French 48 Industry Classifications consider both 6330 and 6331 as the SIC codes for PL insurers 
because they cover the data in early years. However, 6330 was removed from the SIC codes in an historical change 
and has not been used to classify companies’ industries any more. We also search in the Compustat database and 
find no firm assigned to an SIC code 6330 in our sample period (i.e., 2001-2015). So, we follow the literature (e.g., 
Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine,1999) and use only 6331 to identify PL stocks. 
9 As a robustness check, we also use other measures for the industry bias. Specifically, following Seasholes and Zhu 
(2010) and Døskeland and Hvide (2011), we measure the industry bias by the unscaled excess weight (i.e., 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝 −
𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚). Also, following Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), we measure the industry bias by the excess weight 
scaled by the percentage of the market portfolio in the other stocks (i.e., (𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚)/(1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚)). We conduct our 
following analysis using these alternative measures, and we find that our results are qualitatively the same. 
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Investigation of Familiarity 
To investigate the nature of the familiarity, following Seasholes and Zhu (2010) and 
Døskeland and Hvide (2011), we use the abnormal returns (or “Alpha”) from PL insurers’ 
transactions-based calendar-time portfolios as an indicator of asymmetric information and test 
whether PL insurers’ trades of their industrially close stocks earn superior returns. We employ 
the Alpha in the asset pricing model as an indicator of asymmetric information. If the Alpha is 
positive and significant, the information-based familiarity hypothesis will be supported. 
Otherwise, the pure familiarity hypothesis will be supported. 
The transactions-based calendar-time portfolios approach employs the transactions data 
and mimics the buys and sells by forming “Buys” and “Sells” calendar-time portfolios. Each 
time a PL insurer buys (sells) a stock in the PL insurance industry, we place the same number of 
shares in the calendar-time “Buys” (“Sells”) portfolio at the end of the day. We follow a buy-
and-hold strategy and assume that the shares will be held in the portfolio for 3 months, 6 months, 
9 months, and 12 months, respectively. We calculate the value-weighted returns on the “Buys” 
portfolio and the “Sells” portfolio and regress the return difference between these two portfolios 
("Buys-minus-Sells") of all PL insurers (𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 − 𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵) on the excess market return (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) 
and the Fama-French factors (i.e., SMB and HML) or the Fama-French-Carhart factors (i.e., 
SMB, HML, and MOM). The models for the regressions are as follows, 
𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 − 𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓� + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻                         (2) 
𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 − 𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓� + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆            (3) 
The significance of the Alpha is tested by a t-test that is based on Newey-West standard 
errors with five lags and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of residuals. 
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Investigation of Hedging 
To test the hedging-risk hypothesis, we examine the relation between the portfolio tilt 
regarding the industrially close stocks and the underwriting risk. We use the proportion of 
investment (wp) and the industry bias (IB) in the PL insurance industry as the dependent 
variables. Since the proportion is bounded to the range from 0 to 1 and the industry bias is 
bounded to the range from -1 to (1-wm)/wm, we employ the Tobit model with random effects10. 
Apart from the Tobit model, we also use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure in order to 
incorporate insurers’ firm fixed effects11. The regression model can be written as follows, 
𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼=𝑓𝑓(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅, 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)                                          (4) 
Consistent with Ho, Lai, and Lee (2013) and Han, Lai, and Ho (2015), we measure 
underwriting risk (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅) by the rolling standard deviation of underwriting loss ratio over 
the previous five years, and the underwriting loss ratio is defined as a ratio of losses incurred and 
loss adjustment expenses to premiums earned.  
Prior literature that investigates the role of investor characteristics in determining 
portfolio choice predominately focuses on individual investors because the proprietary data of 
individual investors make it possible to observe both the investors’ investment and their 
background (e.g., Massa and Simonov, 2006; Døskeland and Hvide, 2011; Keloharju, Knüpfer, 
and Linnainmaa, 2012). However, few studies investigate the effects of firm characteristics on 
institutional investors’ portfolio choice. Therefore, we apply the available control variables for 
                                                 
10 In econometrics, a sufficient statistic that allows firm fixed effects to be conditioned out of likelihood does not 
exist. Therefore, we need to choose between a pooled regression model and a random effect model. We perform a 
likelihood-ratio test, and the results from the test suggest that the random effects should be included in the model. 
11 In the first stage, we model the decision to invest in the PL insurance industry as a function of the explanatory 
variables that appear in the second stage and the correlation between the PL insurers’ non-financial income 
(measured by underwriting loss ratio) and the market portfolio. In the second stage, we regress the proportion of 
investment or the industry bias on a vector of explanatory variables and Heckman’s lambda. Additionally, we 
control for the firm fixed effects in the second stage. 
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individuals to institutions in our multivariate regression analysis. Following Døskeland and 
Hvide (2011), our controls consist of the industry experience, gross wealth, income, listing status 
of the investor’s company, market value of the stock portfolio, portfolio diversification, and the 
number of stocks in the industry. Specifically, we measure the industry experience by the firm 
age (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), which is calculated as natural logarithm of the number of years since commencement, 
measure the gross wealth by the firm size (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴), which is calculated as the natural logarithm of 
total net admitted assets, and measure the income by the size of net premiums written 
(𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴), which is calculated as the natural logarithm of total net premiums written. The 
listing status is measured by a dummy variable (𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) that is equal to 1 for a publicly-traded 
insurer and 0 for a private insurer. The market value of common stock portfolio (𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀) is 
measured by the natural logarithm of total market value of common stock holdings. Portfolio 
diversification (𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) is measured by the natural logarithm of the number of stocks held by 
the insurer. To control for the number of stocks in the industry at the end of each year and all 
other unobservable year-specific factors, we include the year fixed effects in the model. 
Ho, Lai, and Lee (2013) also provide several explanatory variables that can affect 
insurers’ investment risk taking. Following Ho, Lai, and Lee (2013), we also control for the 
organization form, reinsurance usage, long-tail insurance, business line diversification, and 
geographic diversification. Specifically, the organization form (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻) is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 for a mutual insurer and 0 for a stock insurer. Reinsurance usage 
(𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴) is measured by the reinsurance ratio, which is calculated as the ratio of 
premiums ceded to the sum of direct premiums written and reinsurance assumed. The weight of 
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long-tail insurance (𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻) is the percentage of net premiums written on long-tail lines12. 
Following Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer (2012), the business line 
diversification (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) is calculated as the complement of the Herfindahl Index of net 
premiums written (𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) across 24 lines of business13. The calculation is shown as follows: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − ∑ �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 �224𝑗𝑗=1                                           (5) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 denotes the net premiums written by insurer 𝑖𝑖 in line 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,24 in year 𝐶𝐶, and 
𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the total net premiums written by insurer 𝑖𝑖 in a given year 𝐶𝐶. Larger values of  
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  represent higher levels of diversification. Following Liebenberg and Sommer 
(2008), we measure the geographic diversification measure (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) by the complement of 
the Herfindahl Index of direct premiums written (𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) across 58 states and territories14. Its 
calculation is as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − ∑ �𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 �258𝑘𝑘=1                                           (6) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 denotes the direct premiums written by an insurer 𝑖𝑖 in state 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,58 in year 𝐶𝐶, 
and 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the total direct premiums written in a given year t. Since the U.S. insurance 
industry is regulated by each state, we control for the state fixed effects to deal with the 
unobservable and potential effects of state regulations. In addition, insurers operating in different 
                                                 
12 Consistent with Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998), long-tail lines include Ocean Marine, Medical Professional 
Liability, International, Reinsurance, Workers’ Compensation, Other Liability, Product Liability, Aircraft, Boiler 
and Machinery, Farmowners Multiple Peril, Homeowners Multiple Peril, Commercial Multiple Peril, and 
Automobile Liability. Short-tail lines include the following: Inland Marine, Financial Guaranty, Earthquake, 
Fidelity, Surety, Burglary and Theft, Credit, Fire and Allied Lines, Mortgage Guaranty, and Automobile Physical 
Damage. 
13 Following Berry-Stölzle et al. (2012), we group similar business lines into 24 distinct lines written by PL insurers: 
Accident and Health, Aircraft, Auto, Boiler and Machinery, Burglary and Theft, Commercial Multiple Peril, Credit, 
Earthquake, Farmowners’ Multiple Peril, Financial Guaranty, Fidelity, Fire and Allied lines, Homeowners’ Multiple 
Peril, Inland Marine, International, Medical Professional Liability, Mortgage Guaranty, Ocean Marine, Other, Other 
Liability, Products Liability, Reinsurance, Surety, and Workers’ Compensation. 
14 We obtain premiums written across states and territories from Schedule T of the NAIC Annual Statements.  
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business lines may have different risk appetite. So we also include the line fixed effects in our 
regressions. 
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DATA AND SAMPLE 
We obtain the common stock holdings and transactions (i.e., buys and sells) data of PL 
insurers from the NAIC InfoPro database for the years 200115 through 2015. Our data cover the 
common stocks of unaffiliated firms on Schedule D (Parts 2 – 5) of PL insurers’ annual statutory 
statements. We delete stock holdings, buys, and sells with non-positive number of shares or 
value16 and aggregate the data of the same stock for each insurer on each portfolio date (i.e., 
year-end) or transaction date. The stock information (e.g., price, cumulative factor, SIC codes, 
returns) is obtained from the CRSP database and merged with our stock holdings and 
transactions data. Specifically, stock holdings are merged with the their most recent 17 stock 
information in each year, and stock buys and sells are merged with their stock information on 
each transaction date. We remove the stocks in our data that cannot be merged with the CRSP 
database. Because we focus on the industry bias, the industry classification of each stock is 
needed for our study. We obtain the Fama-French 48 Industry Classification from Kenneth R. 
French's website and remove stocks that do not have an SIC code in their classification. 
                                                 
15 We choose 2001 as our starting year because before 2001, the transaction dates are recorded as “VARIOUS” in 
the Schedule D of insurers’ statutory statements if a stock is traded on multiple different dates. Therefore, we are 
unable to identify the transaction dates for these stocks, which are needed by our transactions-based calendar-time 
portfolios. 
16 For stock holdings, the value refers to the fair value. For stock buys, the value refers to the actual costs. For stock 
sells, the value refers to the adjusted carrying value. 
17 The purpose of merging stock holdings with the CRSP database is to get the SIC code for industry classification, 
and a stock’s SIC code does not change often in a year. Therefore, if a stock’s information is not available on the 
last trading day in a year, its most recent information in that year is used. 
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The detailed data screening process and the number of observations remaining in our 
sample following each step are reported in panels A, B, and C of Table 1. Our stock holdings 
sample includes 956,302 insurer-stock-year observations, our stock buys sample includes 
966,048 insurer-stock-day observations, and our stock sells sample includes 896,040 insurer-
stock-day observations. Table 2 reports the time series average of stock holdings, buys, and sells, 
respectively, across all years in the sample period. We find that on average, PL insurers’ 
holdings of publicly traded common stocks are $133.30 billion, stock buys are $32.80 billion, 
and stock sells are $27.20 billion. 
In our investigation of familiarity with the transactions-based calendar-time portfolios, 
we obtain the risk-free rate, Fama-French factors (i.e., 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼  and 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 ) and the Carhart 
momentum factor (i.e., 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆) from Kenneth R. French's website.  
In our analysis of the hedging motive, we also obtain the financial data of PL insurers 
from the NAIC InfoPro database. We exclude insurers with non-positive total net admitted assets, 
net premiums written, and an organizational form other than stock or mutual (e.g., Che and 
Liebenberg, 2017). We also exclude insurers with a non-positive market value of common stock 
portfolio. We find that many observations drop out of the sample because a significant number of 
insurers do not invest in publicly traded common stocks. Finally, we remove insurers that do not 
have sufficient information to calculate the variables in our hedging analysis. The data screening 
process is described in panel D of Table 1. Our final sample for the hedging analysis consists of 
5,843 insurer-year observations. The sample represents, on average, 45.94 percent (54.16 percent) 
of the entire U.S. PL insurance industry in terms of the net admitted assets (net premiums written) 
across all years during our sample period. In addition, we winsorize the underwriting risk and the 
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reinsurance ratio at the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile level to reduce the potential effects 
of outliers18. The summary statistics are presented in the “Hedging” section. 
                                                 
18 We detect the outliers by a scatter plot and the Cook’s distance test. Both suggest that outliers are present in our 
values of the underwriting risk and the reinsurance ratio. 
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Table 1 
Data Screen 
 
  Screen Criteria 
Number of 
Observations 
Panel A: Stock Holdings (Insurer-Stock -Year Observations) 
(i) Obtain PL insurers' stock holdings (unaffiliated) from the NAIC InfoPro database (Schedule D-Part 2-Section 2) (2001-2015). 1,292,954 
(ii) Remove stock holdings with non-positive number of shares or fair value. 1,279,602 
(iii) Aggregate holdings of the same stocks for each insurer on each portfolio date (year-end) for each PL insurer. 1,184,395 
(iv) Remove stock holdings that cannot be merged with the CRSP database (most recent information in each year). 968,761 
(v) Remove stocks holdings without an SIC code in Fama-French 48 Industry Classification. 956,302 
Panel B: Stock Buys (Insurer-Stock -Day Observations) 
(i) Obtain PL insurers' stock buys (unaffiliated) from the NAIC InfoPro database (Schedule D-Part 3 and Part 5) (2001-2015). 1,394,770 
(ii) Remove stock buys with non-positive number of shares or actual costs. 1,351,234 
(iii) Aggregate buys of the same stocks for each insurer on each transaction date for each PL insurer. 1,229,701 
(iv) Remove stocks buys that cannot be merged with the CRSP database on each transaction date. 980,179 
(v) Remove stocks buys without an SIC code in Fama-French 48 Industry Classification. 966,048 
Panel C: Stock Sells (Insurer-Stock -Day Observations) 
(i) Obtain PL insurers' stock sells (unaffiliated) from the NAIC InfoPro database (Schedule D-Part 4 and Part 5) (2001-2015). 1,474,635 
(ii) Remove stock sells with non-positive number of shares or adjusted carrying value. 1,417,644 
(iii) Aggregate sells of the same stocks for each insurer on each transaction date for each PL insurer. 1,150,677 
(iv) Remove stock sells that cannot be merged with the CRSP database on each transaction date. 907,963 
(v) Remove stock sells without an SIC code in Fama-French 48 Industry Classification. 896,040 
Panel D: Financial Data (Insurer-Year Observations) 
(i) Obtain PL insurers' financial data from the NAIC InfoPro database (2001-2015). 19,371 
(ii) Remove PL insurers with non-positive net admitted assets. 19,370 
(iii) Remove PL insurers with non-positive net premiums written. 17,030 
(iv) Remove PL insurers with non-positive market value of a common stock portfolio. 7,280 
(v) Remove PL insurers that are neither mutuals nor stocks. 6,347 
(vi) Remove PL insurers without sufficient information to calculate the variables in the hedging analysis. 5,843 
This table presents the data screenings in our samples. Panel A, B, C, and D report the screen criteria and number of observations in 
the sample of stock holdings, stock buys, stock sells, and financial data respectively. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Stock Holdings and Transactions 
 
  
Number of PL 
Insurers 
(1) 
All 
Stocks 
(2) 
PL Insurance 
Stocks 
(3) 
PL Insurance 
Stocks 
(4) = (3)/(2) 
Other Stocks 
(5) 
Other Stocks 
(6) = (5)/(2) 
Panel A: Stock Holdings 
Num of Stocks 948 3,320.47 50.73 1.53% 3,269.73 98.47% 
Num of Shares (billion) 948 3.02 0.02 0.65% 3.00 99.35% 
Value ($ billion) 948 133.30 1.36 1.02% 131.94 98.98% 
Panel B: Stock Buys 
Num of Transactions (thousand) 863 64.40 0.97 1.52% 63.43 98.48% 
Num of Stocks 863 3,228.53 49.40 1.52% 3,180.80 98.53% 
Num of Shares (billion) 863 0.90 0.01 1.08% 0.89 98.92% 
Value ($ billion) 863 32.80 0.43 1.40% 32.37 98.60% 
Panel C: Stock Sells 
Num of Transactions (thousand) 854 59.74 0.93 1.55% 58.81 98.45% 
Num of Stocks 854 3,227.93 50.20 1.55% 3,179.47 98.50% 
Num of Shares (billion) 854 0.86 0.01 1.33% 0.85 98.67% 
Value ($ billion) 854 27.20 0.43 1.56% 26.77 98.44% 
This table presents the summary statistics of PL insurers’ holdings and transactions (i.e., buys and sells) of publicly traded common 
stocks. Panels A, B, and C report the time series average of stock holdings, buys, and sells, respectively, across all years in the sample 
period (2001-2015). 
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INDUSTRY BIAS 
We present the results for the industry bias in Table 3. Table 3 reports that the average 
percentage of PL insurers’ portfolio in PL stocks across all insurer-year observations is 2.11 
percent, while the average percentage of the market portfolio across all years in the sample 
period in PL stocks is 2.64 percent. The mean of the industry bias is -20.67%, and it is 
statistically significant. The median is -100.00%, implying that more than half of the insurers in 
our sample do not invest in their industry. Overall, we find that contrary to the findings in the 
prior studies on individual investors, PL insurers exhibit a negative industry bias by tilting their 
portfolios away from industrially close stocks. The negative industry bias supports the hedging-
based hypothesis. Therefore, we find initial evidence for the hedging-based theory.  
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Table 3 
Industry Bias 
 
  wp wm 
Industry Bias (IB) 
(wp- wm)/wm 
p-value 
Mean 2.11% 2.64% -20.67% 0.00 
Median 0.00% 2.59% -100.00% 0.00 
This table presents the industry bias in the stock holdings of PL insurers. The industry bias (IB) 
is measured by (wp- wm)/wm, where wp represents the percentage of a PL insurer’s portfolio in 
the PL insurance industry and wm represents the percentage of the market portfolio in the PL 
insurance industry. The significance of the mean is tested by a t-test with its p-value reported. 
The significance of the median is tested by a Wilcoxon rank sum test with its p-value reported. 
The table also reports the mean and the median of wp across all insurer-year observations and wm 
across all years in the sample period.  
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FAMILIARITY 
In the above section, we find evidence in favor of the hedging-based theory. However, it 
is unknown whether the industry bias is purely a product of hedging or a net effect of both 
familiarity and hedging. To answer this question, we first assume that the familiarity also plays a 
role in shaping the industry bias and then examine the nature of familiarity. If we find that PL 
insurers have asymmetric information in investing in their industry, both our initial assumption 
and the information-based familiarity will be supported, implying that the negative industry bias 
reflects a net effect of hedging and familiarity. To investigate the asymmetric information, we 
employ the transactions-based calendar-time portfolios to identify the abnormal returns in PL 
insurers’ trades. The variables in our regression models are defined in Table 4. 
Table 5 reports the results from our transactions-based calendar-time portfolios. We find 
that when the holding period is 3 months, 6 months, and 9 months, the daily abnormal return (i.e., 
Alpha) for holding PL stocks is positive and significant in both the Fama-French 3-Factor model 
and the Carhart 4-Factor model. Specifically, the Alpha is reported to be 0.02 percent or 0.03 
percent, which can be translated into an annual return of roughly 5 percent or 8 percent, 
respectively. However, the Alpha is not significant when the holding period is 12 months. The 
insignificant Alpha in a longer holding period supports the phenomenon of Alpha decay found 
by Di Mascio, Lines, and Naik (2015) and is expected. In the unreported tables, we do not find a 
significant Alpha when PL insurers trade stocks in the other industries regardless of the length of 
the holding period. Overall, we find that PL insurers have an information advantage in investing
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in stocks in the PL insurance industry. Therefore, the information-based familiarity plays a role 
in shaping the negative industry bias in PL stocks even though the net effect is driven by the 
hedging motive.  
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Table 4 
Variables and Their Descriptions in Asymmetric Information Analysis 
 Variable Name Variable Description 
RzBuys-RzSells The return difference between the industry "Buys" portfolio and the industry "Sells" 
portfolio ("Buys-minus-Sells") of all PL insurers. 
RzBuys The value-weighted return of the industry "Buys" portfolio of all PL insurers. 
RzSells The value-weighted return of the industry "Sells" portfolio of all PL insurers. 
Rm-Rf The excess market return for all stocks with an SIC code in Fama-French 48 Industry 
Classification. 
Rm The value-weighted market return for all stocks with an SIC code in Fama-French 48 
Industry Classification. 
Rf The risk-free return. The data are obtained from Kenneth R. French's website. 
SMB The small-minus-big portfolio return. The data are obtained from Kenneth R. French's 
website. 
HML The high-minus-low (book-to-market) portfolio return. The data are obtained from 
Kenneth R. French's website. 
MOM The momentum (winners-minus-losers) portfolio return. The data are obtained from 
Kenneth R. French's website. 
This table reports the variables and their descriptions in the asymmetric information analysis. 
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Table 5 
Regressions with Transaction-Based Calendar-Time Portfolios 
 
 
Dependent Variable: RzBuys-RzSells 
Holding Period 3 Months 
 
6 Months 
 
9 Months 
 
12 Months 
Variables 3-Factor 4-Factor   3-Factor 4-Factor   3-Factor 4-Factor   3-Factor 4-Factor 
Alpha 0.0002* 0.0002* 
 
0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 
0.0002** 0.0002** 
 
0.0001 0.0001 
(t-stat) (1.8360) (1.8023) 
 
(2.6540) (2.6423) 
 
(2.0761) (2.0149) 
 
(1.3746) (1.2591) 
Rm-Rf -0.0399** -0.0356** 
 
-0.0405** -0.0394** 
 
-0.0461*** -0.0400*** 
 
-0.0325** -0.0219* 
(t-stat) (-2.4698) (-2.4292) 
 
(-2.4629) (-2.5590) 
 
(-3.1210) (-2.9204) 
 
(-2.3839) (-1.6798) 
SMB 0.0259 0.0238 
 
0.0245 0.0240 
 
0.0405* 0.0378 
 
0.0213 0.0168 
(t-stat) (0.9559) (0.8784) 
 
(0.9028) (0.8926) 
 
(1.6761) (1.5828) 
 
(1.0270) (0.8201) 
HML -0.0765 -0.0718 
 
-0.0688 -0.0676 
 
-0.0698 -0.0631 
 
-0.0797* -0.0679* 
(t-stat) (-1.5714) (-1.6150) 
 
(-1.4299) (-1.5323) 
 
(-1.6133) (-1.6096) 
 
(-1.9426) (-1.8286) 
MOM 
 
0.0139 
  
0.0036 
  
0.0194 
  
0.0341* 
(t-stat) 
 
(0.5938) 
  
(0.1624) 
  
(0.9582) 
  
(1.8365) 
N. of Obs. 3,830 3,830   3,890 3,890   3,950 3,950   4,010 4,010 
This table reports results from regressions with transactions-based calendar-time portfolios with a holding period of 3 months, 6 
months, 9 months, and 12 months, respectively. The regressions are based on the Fama-French 3-Factor model and the Carhart 4-
Factor model. The dependent variable is the return difference between the PL insurance industry "Buys" portfolio and the PL 
insurance industry "Sells" portfolio ("Buys-minus-Sells") of all PL insurers. The other variables are defined in Table 4. The t-statistics 
are based on Newey-West standard errors with five lags and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of residuals. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 32 
 
HEDGING 
While the negative industry bias provides initial evidence for the hedging-based theory, 
in this section, we attempt to provide more direct evidence for PL insurers’ motive for hedging. 
Specifically, we investigate whether PL insurers’ portfolio tilt away from industrially close 
stocks is positively related to their underwriting risk. The variables are defined in Table 6, and 
the summary statistics is presented in Table 7.  
We employ two different dependent variables to test this relation. The first dependent 
variable that we use is the proportion of PL insurers’ investment portfolio in the PL insurance 
industry. The regression results are reported in Table 8. We find that the coefficient estimate on 
the underwriting risk is negative and significant in both the Tobit model and the Heckman model, 
implying that high underwriting risk leads PL insurers to tilt away from stocks in their industry. 
The second dependent variable we use is the industry bias. Table 9 presents the results. It shows 
that the coefficient estimate on the underwriting risk is negative and significant in both models. 
These findings are consistent with what we report in Table 8 and further support the hedging-risk 
hypothesis. 
Taken together, we find that even though PL insurers have an information advantage with 
respect to trades of PL stocks, their exposure to underwriting risk results in a net portfolio tilt 
away from their own industry. Our results suggest that industry bias is a hybrid product of both 
familiarity and hedging, and that, for PL insurers, the hedging motive dominates the familiarity 
effect. 
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Table 6 
Variables and Their Descriptions in Hedging Analysis 
 Variable Name Variable Description 
wp Proportion of the common stock portfolio in PL insurance stocks. 
IB Industry bias in PL insurance stocks. 
UND_RISK Underwriting risk, as measured by the rolling standard deviation of the loss 
ratio over the previous five years. 
AGE Firm age, as measured by the natural logarithm of the number of years since 
commencement. 
SIZE Firm size, as measured by the natural logarithm of total net admitted assets. 
NPW_SIZE Size of net premiums written, as measured by the natural logarithm of total 
net premiums written. 
PUBLIC Public status, as measured by a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for a 
publicly-traded insurer and 0 for a private insurer. 
PTF_MV Market value of common stock portfolio, as measured by the natural 
logarithm of the total market value of the common stock portfolio. 
PTF_DIV Portfolio diversification, as measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of stocks held by the insurer. 
MUTUAL Organization form, as measured by the dummy variable that is equal to 1 
for a mutual insurer and 0 for a stock insurer. 
REINSURANCE Reinsurance ratio, as measured by the ratio of premiums ceded to the sum 
of direct premiums written and reinsurance assumed. 
LONG_TAIL Weight of long-tail line insurance, as measured by the percentage of net 
premiums written on long-tail lines. 
LINES_DIV Business line diversification, as measured by the complement of the 
Herfindahl Index of net premiums written across all business lines. 
GEO_DIV Geographic diversification, measured by the complement of Herfindahl 
index of direct premiums written across all U.S. states and territories. 
This table reports the variables and their descriptions in the hedging analysis. 
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Table 7 
Summary Statistics for Hedging Analysis 
 
Variable Name N Mean Median Min Max 
Std. 
Dev. 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
wp 5,843 0.0173 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0636 0.0000 0.0135 
IB 5,843 -0.3393 -1.0000 -1.0000 40.8100 2.4251 -1.0000 -0.5004 
UND_RISK 5,843 0.1530 0.0824 0.0105 3.1723 0.3357 0.0503 0.1386 
AGE 5,843 3.7085 3.8067 0.0000 5.3706 0.9831 2.9957 4.6540 
SIZE 5,843 17.7717 17.6543 11.5375 23.7304 1.7299 16.5383 18.9791 
NPW_SIZE 5,843 16.5885 16.6905 5.5013 22.1558 1.9930 15.3491 17.9766 
PUBLIC 5,843 0.0426 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2020 0.0000 0.0000 
PTF_MV 5,843 14.6527 14.7492 1.0986 22.1642 2.3611 13.2816 16.2089 
PTF_DIV 5,843 3.0987 3.4012 0.0000 7.2349 1.5534 2.0794 4.1109 
MUTUAL 5,843 0.4528 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4978 0.0000 1.0000 
REINSURANCE 5,843 0.2476 0.1899 0.0000 0.8732 0.2152 0.0779 0.3654 
LONG_TAIL 5,843 0.6979 0.7934 0.0000 1.0000 0.3233 0.6024 0.9492 
LINES_DIV 5,843 0.3565 0.4025 0.0000 0.8537 0.3008 0.0000 0.6510 
GEO_DIV 5,843 0.3001 0.0838 0.0000 0.9650 0.3485 0.0000 0.6294 
This table presents the summary statistics of the sample in the hedging analysis. All variables are 
defined in Table 6. 
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Table 8 
Effects of Underwriting Risk on Proportion of Investment in PL Insurance 
Industry 
 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Investment in PL Insurance Industry (wp) 
Model: Tobit Heckman 
INTERCEPT -0.4366*** -0.3221 
 
(0.0611) (0.2675) 
UND_RISK -0.0180** -0.0261*** 
 
(0.0082) (0.0081) 
AGE 0.0015 0.0122 
 
(0.0061) (0.0189) 
SIZE 0.0187*** 0.0220 
 
(0.0060) (0.0159) 
NPW_SIZE 0.0003 -0.0042 
 
(0.0047) (0.0098) 
PUBLIC -0.0011 0.0337** 
 
(0.0205) (0.0153) 
PTF_MV -0.0073*** -0.0221** 
 (0.0025) (0.0086) 
PTF_DIV 0.0343*** 0.0297*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0101) 
MUTUAL -0.0084 -0.0424** 
 (0.0111) (0.0182) 
REINSURANCE -0.0369** -0.0281 
 (0.0165) (0.0346) 
LONG_TAIL 0.0056 0.0135 
 (0.0167) (0.0318) 
LINES_DIV -0.0482** -0.0076 
 (0.0223) (0.0338) 
GEO_DIV 0.0069 0.0162 
 (0.0188) (0.0314) 
Lambda 
 
0.1153*** 
 
 
(0.0200) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes 
Line Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
N. of Obs. 5,843 2,094 
This table presents the results from the regression of the proportion of investment in the PL 
insurance industry on the underwriting risk. The dependent variable is the proportion of common 
stock portfolio in the PL insurance industry. The other variables are defined in Table 6. The 
regression models are Tobit and Heckman. For the Tobit model, the left-censoring limit is 0, the 
right-censoring limit is 1, and random effects are included. For the Heckman model, firm fixed 
effects are included in the second stage. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
insurer level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Effects of Underwriting Risk on Industry Bias in the PL Insurance Industry 
 
Dependent Variable: Industry Bias in PL Insurance Industry (IB) 
Model: Tobit Heckman 
INTERCEPT -17.4515*** -12.9273 
 
(2.2819) (9.0564) 
UND_RISK -0.6563** -0.8983*** 
 
(0.3116) (0.2976) 
AGE 0.0260 0.4721 
 
(0.2291) (0.7316) 
SIZE 0.6897*** 0.8218 
 
(0.2260) (0.6080) 
NPW_SIZE -0.0017 -0.1703 
 
(0.1758) (0.3442) 
PUBLIC -0.0628 1.3522** 
 
(0.7747) (0.5944) 
PTF_MV -0.2515*** -0.7977*** 
 (0.0940) (0.3069) 
PTF_DIV 1.2930*** 0.9984** 
 (0.1092) (0.3994) 
MUTUAL -0.3164 -1.5101** 
 (0.4157) (0.6583) 
REINSURANCE -1.4012** -1.3715 
 (0.6250) (1.2397) 
LONG_TAIL 0.2419 0.5273 
 (0.6260) (1.2572) 
LINES_DIV -1.6859** 0.3438 
 (0.8428) (1.2262) 
GEO_DIV 0.2075 0.4203 
 (0.7069) (1.2347) 
Lambda 
 
0.4203 
 
 
(1.2347) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes 
Line Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
N. of Obs. 5,843 2,094 
This table presents the results from the regression of the industry bias on the underwriting risk. 
The dependent variable is the industry bias. The other variables are defined in Table 6. The 
regression models are Tobit and Heckman. For the Tobit model, the left-censoring limit is -1, the 
right-censoring limit is (1- wm)/ wm, and random effects are included. For the Heckman model, 
firm fixed effects are included in the second stage. The standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the insurer level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this study, we investigate the industry bias in PL insurers’ common stock portfolios. 
There are two competing theories in predicting the industry bias. The familiarity-based theory 
suggests that investors should tilt their portfolios toward industrially close stocks, while the 
hedging-based theory argues that investors should hedge their non-financial income risk by 
tilting their portfolios toward the industrially remote stocks. In terms of the familiarity, it can be 
driven by either asymmetric information or a behavioral bias, and prior studies have found 
conflicting empirical evidence. 
Through empirical analysis, we provide evidence in support of both the familiarity-based 
theory and the hedging-based theory. Specifically, we find a negative industry bias in PL insurers’ 
common stock portfolios, implying that PL insurers tilt their common stock portfolios away from 
their industry and toward the other industries. Then we investigate the nature of the industry bias. 
We show that PL insurers have information advantages in investing in their industrially close 
stocks, supporting the information-based familiarity. In addition, we find direct evidence in 
support of the hedging motive. Specifically, the underwriting risk leads PL insurers to tilt their 
portfolios away from their industrially close stocks. Therefore, we conclude that the PL insurers’ 
negative industry bias is driven by hedging even though they have asymmetric information in 
their industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A basic tenet of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965) is that exposure to market risk is compensated by the market risk premium. The model 
implies that investors invest in the portfolio with the highest expected excess return per unit of 
risk (Sharpe ratio). However, prior studies have found that the security market line (SML) (i.e., 
the line relating the expected return on a risky asset to its beta) is too flat relative to the CAPM 
(e.g., Black, 1972; Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Friend and Blume, 1970; Black, 1993; 
Mehrling, 2005). For example, Friend and Blume (1970) and Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) 
demonstrate that the high-beta portfolio produces lower returns than implied by the CAPM and 
therefore has a negative alpha (i.e., is overpriced), while the low-beta portfolio produces higher 
returns than implied by the CAPM and therefore has a positive alpha (i.e., is underpriced), both 
contributing to the SML flatness. The positive (negative) abnormal returns of low-beta (high-
beta) portfolios are referred to as the beta anomaly, which implies that the low-beta portfolio 
outperforms the high-beta portfolio (e.g., Bali, Brown, Murray, and Tang, 2016)19.  
Based on the beta anomaly found in the prior literature, Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) 
propose the betting-against-beta (BAB) strategy. BAB refers to the behavior of portfolio tilting 
toward low-beta assets and applying leverage. Given that the target excess return and the overall 
risk do not change, leverage must be used to boost the excess return of the low-beta portfolio to
                                                 
19 Prior studies also report that the beta anomaly is more pronounced after controlling for size and book-to-market 
characteristics (Fama and French, 1992; Fama and French, 2006) and during the periods of high inflation (Cohen, 
Polk, and Voulteenaho, 2005), disagreement about stock market earnings (Hong and Sraer, 2016), and investor 
sentiment (Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam, 2015). 
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the level of the high-beta portfolio20. Utilizing data in multiple financial markets, they confirm 
the outperformance of the low-beta assets. Thus, they postulate that investors who are less 
financially constrained should overweight low-beta assets in their portfolios. Consistent with 
their prediction, they find anecdotal evidence in the real world that Berkshire Hathaway and 
leveraged buyout (LBO) funds, who use leverage, hold portfolios of a lower beta than retail 
investors and mutual funds, who are likely to be constrained. However, the BAB strategy is 
challenged by Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016). They argue that the alphas estimated by prior 
literature using the unconditional CAPM are downward biased estimates of true alphas. They 
find evidence that the conditional CAPM can resolve the beta anomaly. Specifically, the 
differences in conditional alphas across beta portfolios are statistically insignificant. Therefore, 
Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016) conclude that it does not pay to bet against beta.  
However, whether investors in the real world bet against beta has not been formally 
examined in the prior literature. So, it is still unknown whether investors who use leverage tilt 
toward low-beta assets in order to earn abnormal returns. If the beta anomaly is purely a product 
of an estimation bias in the unconditional CAPM, we would expect that investors do not bet 
                                                 
20 The BAB strategy requires leverage, and the leverage distinguishes the betting against beta from portfolio tilt due 
to changes in investors’ risk appetite. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) provide an example of Treasuries to illustrate the 
economic mechanism that could be at work. The following is another similar numerical example. For simplicity, 
suppose there is no risk-free return (i.e., risk-free rate is zero), interest of borrowing (i.e., interest rate is zero), tax on 
capital gains (i.e., tax rate is zero), or abnormal returns (i.e., alpha is zero). Also assume that the market return is 1% 
and its volatility is 1%. If an investor invests $1 in a stock with a beta of 2 then the excess return of this stock can be 
calculated as 2×1%=2%. Since the abnormal return is assumed to be zero, the total return will also be 2%. The 
volatility of the stock returns is equal to the product of the volatility of the market returns and the stock beta (i.e., 
1%×2=2%). If this investor rather chooses to invest the $1 in a stock with a beta of 1 then the excess return is 
1×1%=1%, the total return is 1%, and the return volatility is 1% (i.e., 1%×1=1%). In the latter case, the investor 
holds a stock that has a lower risk and a lower return, but the Sharpe ratio remains the same (i.e., both are 1). 
However, if this investor borrows another $1 and invests his $2 in the stock with a beta of 1, the investor will obtain 
a portfolio that has an excess return of 2%, a total return of 2%, and a volatility of 2%. Correspondingly, the 
portfolio beta becomes 2. Thus, in this case with borrowing, the excess return, total return, volatility, and Sharpe 
ratio are the identical to those in the case when the investor invests just $1 in a stock with a beta of 2 without 
borrowing. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) suggest that the incentive for the investor to borrow money and switch to 
low-beta stocks, albeit the portfolio beta is unchanged, is to pursue low-beta stocks’ higher abnormal returns (i.e., 
alpha), which we assume to be 0 in this example. Therefore, leverage is indispensable in the BAB strategy, and the 
simple portfolio tilt toward low-beta stocks without applying leverage is not betting against beta and may reflect just 
changes in investors’ risk appetite. 
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against beta and the negative leverage-beta relation found by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) from 
the anecdotal evidence does not hold. In this study, we investigate the common stock portfolios 
of the U.S. property-liability (PL) insurers and attempt to bridge this gap.  
An important advantage of studying PL insurers is that we can directly observe their 
leverage. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) use Berkshire Hathaway as an example of the investor 
who uses leverage and examine whether it bets against beta. They report that Berkshire 
Hathaway employs leverage via insurance float and issuing debt. In our study, PL insurers apply 
leverage in the same way. They collect premiums upfront and pay claims later, and the collected 
premiums that have not been paid out in claims are referred to as insurance float21. PL insurers 
invest the float to earn investment income until claims are paid out, and thus, the float is an 
important component of PL insurers’ leverage in their investing. In the literature, the leverage 
funded by the float is named insurance leverage (Xie, Wang, Zhao, and Lu, 2017). Besides the 
insurance leverage, PL insurers also utilize debt financing via both long-term and short-term debt 
issuances22. According to a special report by A.M. Best (2017), the aggregate debt-to-capital 
ratio of publicly traded PL insurers is 50 percent at the beginning of 2009. Even though the ratio 
declines to 25 percent at the end of 2012 due to the 2008 financial crisis, it has maintained within 
the range between 22 percent to 25 percent since the beginning of 2013. In the literature, this 
leverage is named financial debt leverage (Xie et al., 2017). In our study, we follow Frazzini and 
Pedersen (2014) and use the total firm leverage as a comprehensive measure of leverage that 
                                                 
21 To be more specific, “the major components of float are unpaid losses, life, annuity and health benefit liabilities, 
unearned premiums and other liabilities to policyholders less premium and reinsurance receivables, deferred charges 
assumed under retroactive reinsurance contracts and deferred policy acquisition costs (Berkshire Hathaway, 2016).” 
22 To be more specific, the financial debt of PL insurers consists of borrowed money and interest thereon, amount 
withheld or retained for account of others, adjustment in liabilities due to exchange rates, drafts outstanding, payable 
to parent, subs and affiliates, derivatives, payable for securities and payable for securities lending (Xie et al., 2017). 
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reflects both PL insurers’ insurance leverage and their financial debt leverage23. The statutory 
statements of PL insurers contain all the data needed to calculate this measure and make it viable 
to examine the investors’ leverage. By contrast, we do not choose to study some other investors 
(e.g., individual investors and hedge funds 24) because it is difficult to observe their leverage 
without access to proprietary data. 
Through empirical analysis, we find that the PL insurers’ portfolio beta choice is not 
negatively related to their leverage, implying that they do not bet against beta. We also explore 
the explanation by testing the performance of their low-beta holdings and high-beta holdings. 
Using a holdings-based calendar-time portfolio approach, we find that the differences in neither 
unconditional alphas nor conditional alphas across the beta portfolios are statistically significant, 
suggesting that the low-beta portfolio does not outperform the high-beta portfolio. Taken 
together, our study suggests that the BAB does not exist. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The “Literature Review” provides a 
summary of the prior literature. The “Hypotheses Development” section proposes the hypotheses 
that we test in this study. Next, the “Empirical Method” section presents the methods used in our 
empirical analysis. Then, the “Data and Sample” section describes the data and sample used in 
our analysis. The “Portfolio Tilt Regarding Beta” section reports the results from the examining 
the portfolio tilt toward various levels of beta. The “Beta-Leverage Relation” section reports the 
results from the analyzing the effects of leverage on the portfolio beta choice. The “Performance 
of the BAB Strategy” section presents the results from comparing the performance of the low-
beta portfolio and the performance of the high-beta portfolio. Last, the “Conclusion” section 
concludes our study.
                                                 
23 We also reproduce the results in our analysis using the insurance leverage and the financial debt leverage 
individually, and the results are qualitatively the same. 
24 See Ang, Gorovyy, and Van Inwegen (2011). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior studies widely document a beta anomaly in stock returns (e.g., Black, 1972; Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Friend and Blume, 1970; Black, 1993; Mehrling, 2005). For example, 
Friend and Blume (1970) and Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) find that portfolios of high-beta 
(low-beta) stocks earn lower (higher) returns than predicted by the CAPM model, implying that 
their alphas are negative (positive). Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) formalize this idea and propose 
the BAB strategy. They argue that the trading strategy that takes a short position on high-beta 
assets and a long positive on levered low-beta assets generates superior excess returns and 
investors who are less financially constrained should overweight low-beta assets. They provide 
consistent empirical evidence in support of their propositions. 
Following Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), many studies find further evidence for the beta 
anomaly. For example, Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2014) address the concern that the 
superior return of low-beta stocks might be simply due to the industry bets that favor a slowly 
changing set of stodgy and stable industries. They examine the benefits of betting against beta 
using two new BAB factors, the industry-neutral BAB and the BAB as a pure industry bet. Their 
evidence disproves the notion that BAB is merely an industry bet. They show that betting against 
beta can generate positive risk-adjusted returns both as an industry-neutral bet within each 
industry and as a pure bet across industries. They also investigate the performance of the BAB 
factors net of transaction costs. They find that the performance of the BAB factors remains 
significant for the regular BAB, the industry-neutral BAB, and the industry BAB. 
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Many studies also attempt to identify the driver of the beta anomaly. For example, Bali, 
Brown, Murray, and Tang (2016) investigate the role of a lottery demand factor in explaining 
expected stock returns. The find that the demand for lottery-like stocks is an important driver of 
beta anomaly. Specifically, they show that the beta anomaly does not exist when the beta-sorted 
portfolios are constructed to be neutral to lottery demand and it exists only when the price impact 
of lottery demand falls disproportionately on high-beta stocks. In addition, they show that the 
beta anomaly is concentrated in stocks with low levels of institutional ownership. Novy-Marx 
(2016) investigates the driver of the beta anomaly from the perspective of firm characteristics. 
He finds that the tilt of high-beta stocks toward small, unprofitable, and growth firms explains 
the poor absolute performance of the aggressive stocks. Huang, Lou, and Polk (2016) study the 
response of arbitrageurs to the flatness of the SML and find that the beta arbitrage activities 
instead produce booms and busts in the strategy’s abnormal trading profits. Specifically, the 
abnormal returns take longer to materialize when the beta arbitrage activity is low, and the price 
overshoot as the short-run abnormal returns are larger when the beta arbitrage activity is high. 
They also show a novel positive-feedback channel operating through the firm leverage that 
facilitates the booms and busts. Malkhozov, Mueller, Vedolin, and Venter (2016) investigate the 
effects of frictions on asset prices internationally and find that local illiquidity helps explain the 
variations in the performance of BAB strategies across countries. They show that trading 
strategies conditional on illiquidity are associated with highly significant alphas and Sharpe 
ratios. Boguth and Simutin (2016) propose a demand-based measure of the leverage constraints 
in mutual funds and find that the average market beta of actively managed mutual funds captures 
the leverage demand and the tightness of leverage constraints and strongly predicts returns of 
BAB portfolios.  
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Even though the BAB strategy has been widely documented in the literature, its 
theoretical basis is severely undermined by Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016). We revisit the 
BAB strategy proposed by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and discuss the argument of Cederburg 
and O’Doherty (2016) in the following section while developing our hypotheses.
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
According to Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), the BAB strategy is long leveraged low-beta 
stocks and short high-beta stocks. Their model implies that the slope of the SML depends on the 
tightness of funding constraints, which vary across both investors and time. To illustrate the asset 
pricing effects of funding constraints, they construct a BAB factor, which is a portfolio that holds 
low-beta assets, leveraged to a beta of one, and that shorts high-beta assets, deleveraged to a beta 
of one. They predict that the BAB factor earns a positive return and the return is positively 
related to both the funding constraints and the spread in betas between high-beta and low-beta 
securities. In addition, their model implies that the market must be segmented on beta. 
Specifically, given that BAB is profitable and leverage is required in this investment strategy, 
they argue that the investors who are more-constrained should overweight high-beta assets in 
their portfolios, while less-constrained investors should overweight low-beta assets in their 
portfolios by applying leverage.  
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) empirically test their BAB strategy by studying a sample of 
U.S. and international securities. They find that the high-beta portfolio has a lower alpha and a 
lower Sharpe ratio than the low-beta portfolio and the SML flatness is a common issue on not 
only U.S. equity markets but also international equity markets, Treasury markets, and future 
markets. Therefore, investors should have an incentive to apply leverage and tilt their portfolios 
toward low-beta stocks. Even though Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) do not formally test this 
proposition, they examine the portfolios held by several classes of investors and provide 
 51 
 
consistent anecdotal evidence. Specifically, they show that Berkshire Hathaway and leveraged 
buyout (LBO) funds, who use leverage, hold portfolios with a beta that is significantly below one. 
By contrast, mutual funds and retail investors, who are likely to be constrained, hold portfolios 
with a beta that is significantly above one. Their study implies that the portfolio beta is 
negatively related to the investors’ leverage. Similar to Berkshire Hathaway, PL insurers invest 
in common stocks and apply leverage via insurance float and issuing debt. If the BAB strategy 
holds, their low-beta portfolio should outperform their high-beta portfolio, and the higher PL 
insurers’ leverage, the more capital they should allocate to low-beta stocks in order to obtain a 
higher alpha.  
However, the BAB strategy is challenged by Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016). Their 
argument is based on the prior literature on the bias of unconditional alphas. Many studies report 
that unconditional alphas are biased estimates of true alphas if betas vary with the market risk 
premium or market volatility (e.g., Grant, 1977; Jagannathan and Wang, 1996; Lewellen and 
Nagel, 2006; Boguth, Carlson, Fisher, and Simutin, 2011). Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016) 
analyze the systematic trends of the portfolio beta for the high-minus-low beta portfolio, the 
market excess return, and the market volatility. They show that the beta is negatively related to 
the expected excess return on the market and positively related to market volatility, both 
contributing to a negative bias in unconditional alphas. Therefore, they reconsider the evidence 
of the beta anomaly and investigate the abnormal returns of the BAB strategy. They find that in 
comparison to the unconditional case, the differences in conditional alphas across beta portfolios 
are substantially smaller in economic magnitude and statistically insignificant. In other words, 
low-beta stocks do not outperform high-beta stocks, implying that betting against beta does not 
pay. Their study suggests that the conditional CAPM successfully resolves the beta anomaly. 
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Therefore, investors should not have an incentive to apply leverage and bet against beta. In other 
words, leverage is not a determinant of investors’ portfolio beta choice.  
In our setting, if the unconditional alphas are biased estimates of the true alphas and the 
BAB strategy does not hold, we would expect that the PL insurers’ low-beta portfolio does not 
outperform their high-beta portfolio. Therefore, they should not have any incentive to bet against 
beta. So, the relation between PL insurers’ portfolio beta and their leverage is not supposed to be 
negative or significant. Taken together, the above discussion leads to the following competing 
hypotheses, 
H1 (Beta-Leverage Relation): PL insurers’ portfolio beta is negatively related to their 
leverage. 
H2 (Beta-Leverage Relation): PL insurers’ portfolio beta is not negatively related to 
their leverage. 
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EMPIRICAL METHODS 
Measure of Portfolio Tilt Regarding Beta 
Before testing our hypotheses, we first investigate PL insurers’ beta choice in their 
common stock portfolios. The reporting requirements in the U.S. PL insurance industry allow us 
to observe PL insurers’ common stock holdings at the end of each year. Using their year-end 
actual holding data, we examine whether they tilt their portfolios toward stocks with certain 
betas (i.e., high or low betas). To measure this portfolio tilt, we employ the portfolio bias that is 
commonly used in the literature (e.g., Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009; Seasholes and 
Zhu, 2010; Døskeland and Hvide, 2011). We name the portfolio bias toward different stock betas 
“beta bias (BB)”.  
Following Seasholes and Zhu (2010) and Døskeland and Hvide (2011), we employ the 
market portfolio as the benchmark and use the beta deciles of the stocks in the market portfolio 
as the break points. Consistent with Seasholes and Zhu (2010), our beta bias is measured by the 
excess weight of the stocks in investors’ portfolios over their market weight scaled by the market 
weight in each beta decile. This measure is calculated as follows, 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚
𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚
                                                                (1) 
where wp represents the percentage of a PL insurer’s portfolio in a beta decile and wm represents 
the percentage of the market portfolio in this decile.  
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Unconditional CAPM 
The Sharpe-Linter CAPM theory builds on the mean-variance-efficiency model 
developed by Markowitz (1959). It assumes that (1) all investors are risk averse, (2) all investors 
have the same decision horizons, (3) the capital markets are perfect, and (4) all investors have 
homogenous expectations and portfolio opportunities (e.g., Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Jensen, 
1968; Fama, 1968). The Sharpe-Linter CAPM implies that the expected return on any asset is 
equal to the risk-free interest rate plus the market risk premium, which is the product of the 
premium per unit of beta risk and the asset’s market beta. The equation is as follows, 
𝐴𝐴(𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖) = 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 + �𝐴𝐴(𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚) − 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖                                                      (4) 
where 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 represents the return on asset 𝑖𝑖, 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 represents the risk-free interest rate, 𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 represents the 
market return, and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 represents the asset’s market beta. Jensen (1968) allows for the existence of 
a non-zero constant in the time series regression test. The estimating equation can be written as 
follows, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                         (5) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the excess return for asset 𝑖𝑖 during period 𝐶𝐶 (i.e., 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡), 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 represents 
the excess return of the market portfolio during period 𝐶𝐶 (i.e., 𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡), 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 represents the asset 
𝑖𝑖’s market beta, and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 represents the intercept (“Jensen’s alpha”). The equation (5) is widely 
used as the unconditional CAPM in the literature.  
Following Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), we estimate unconditional betas from rolling 
regressions of excess returns on market excess returns using daily data. The estimated time series 
beta for security 𝑖𝑖 is given by, 
?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 = 𝜌𝜌� 𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎�𝑚𝑚
                                                                       (6) 
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where 𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖 and 𝜎𝜎�𝑚𝑚 are the estimated volatilities for the excess stock returns and the excess market 
returns, respectively, and 𝜌𝜌� represents their correlation. Consistent with Frazzini and Pedersen 
(2014), we use one-year rolling standard deviation for volatilities and a five-year horizon for the 
correlation to account for the fact that correlations move more slowly than volatilities. In 
addition, we require at least six months (120 trading days) of non-missing data to estimate 
volatilities and at least three years (750 trading days) of non-missing data to estimate correlations. 
Following Vasicek (1973) and Elton, Gruber, Brown, and Goetzmann (2003), we shrink the time 
series estimate of beta (?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵) toward the cross-sectional mean (?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵) as follows, 
?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 + (1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖)?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵                                                           (7) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 represents the shrinkage factor. Consistent with Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), we set 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0.6 and ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 = 1 for all stocks in all periods.  
 
Conditional CAPM 
The unconditional tests mentioned in the previous section restrict 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 in Equation 
(5) to be constant. By contrast, the conditional tests model betas as a function of a set of state 
variables (i.e., instruments) (Lewellen and Nagel, 2006). According to Cederburg and O’Doherty 
(2016), the conditional CAPM implies that: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝐴𝐴�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1� − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1� = 0                                        (8) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents portfolio 𝑖𝑖’s excess return during period 𝐶𝐶, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 represents the excess return 
of the market portfolio during period 𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 represents the investor information set at the end of 
period 𝐶𝐶 − 1, and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the conditional beta of portfolio 𝑖𝑖. Correspondingly, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is given 
by: 
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𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1�
𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜� 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1�                                                          (9) 
A common approach in the literature is to use observed macroeconomic variables such as 
the dividend yield and default spread as the state variables (e.g., Shanken, 1990; Ferson and 
Schadt, 1996, Ferson and Harvey, 1999). Boguth et al. (2011) also show that introducing lagged 
realized betas into instrument variables (IV) estimators is effective to correct market- and 
volatility-timing biases25 without overconditioning.  
We follow Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016) and use both the one-step IV (IV1) and the 
two-step IV model (IV2) to examine the performance of PL insurers’ low-beta portfolio and 
high-beta portfolio. The regression model is as follows, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 + �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏                                     (10) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for portfolio 𝑖𝑖 over quarter 𝜏𝜏, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 
represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for the market portfolio over quarter 𝜏𝜏, and 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1 represents a 𝑘𝑘 × 1 vector of instruments for portfolio 𝑖𝑖 over quarter 𝜏𝜏. Fama and French 
(1992 and 2006) show that the risk-return relation becomes even flatter after controlling for both 
size and book-to-market. Therefore, we follow Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016) and investigate 
the portfolio performance in the Fama-French three-factor model. Since the conditional CAPM 
model is based on quarterly portfolio returns, we construct a quarterly version of the Fama-
French size and value factor (𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏, and 𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆,𝜏𝜏) by compounding the monthly returns for the 
long and short sides of each factor. The IV1 regression based on the Fama-French model is as 
follows, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1𝜆𝜆 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 + �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1𝜃𝜃 �𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏 
                                                 
25 As is mentioned in the Section 3 (Hypotheses Development), unconditional alphas are biased estimates of true 
alphas if betas vary with the market risk premium or market volatility (e.g., Grant, 1977; Jagannathan and Wang, 
1996; Lewellen and Nagel, 2006; Boguth et al., 2011). 
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+�𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1𝜂𝜂 �𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆,𝜏𝜏 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏                                                        (11)  
To estimate the two-step IV model, we first use daily portfolio return data to estimate a 
separate CAPM regression for each quarter 𝜏𝜏 and get a time series of nonoverlapping conditional 
CAPM regression parameters. The regression model is given by, 
𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,0𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,1𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,2 �𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗−2 + 𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗−3 + 𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗−43 � + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗            (12) 
where 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗  represents the excess return for a given portfolio 𝑖𝑖  on day 𝑗𝑗  of quarter 𝜏𝜏  and 𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚,𝑗𝑗 
represents the excess market return on day 𝑗𝑗 of quarter 𝜏𝜏. The portfolio beta estimate for quarter 
𝜏𝜏 is as follows, 
?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 ≡  ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖,0 + ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖,1 + ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖,2                                                          (13) 
The first stage model is as follows, 
?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏                                                     (14) 
where ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 represents the estimated quarterly portfolio beta and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1 represents a 𝑘𝑘 × 1 vector 
of instruments for a given portfolio. The second stage model is as follows, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼2 + �𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖,1𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏                                      (15) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for portfolio 𝑖𝑖 over quarter 𝜏𝜏 and 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for the market portfolio. 
The instruments 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1  are needed in both the one-step and the two-step IV model. 
Following Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016), we include the common macroeconomic state 
variables (i.e., dividend yield26 and default spread27) and lagged short-term and long-term betas 
in the set of conditioning information. For the lagged short-term and long-term betas, we use 
                                                 
26 Following Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016), the dividend yield is calculated as the log of the sum of dividends 
accruing to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio over the prior 12 months minus the log of the lagged index 
level. 
27 Following Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016), the default spread is calculated as the yield spread between Moody’s 
Baa- and Aaa-rated bonds. 
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lagged three-month and 36-month beta (𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3 and 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿36) measures (i.e., lagged-component betas). 
The lagged-component (LC) beta for a given portfolio at the end of quarter 𝜏𝜏 − 1 is estimated as 
the portfolio-weighted average of lagged beta estimates for constituent firms to be included in 
the portfolio in quarter 𝜏𝜏. Following the advice of Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016), we avoid 
using any firm return data that overlap with the data used to estimate the portfolio formation-
period betas. As is discussed later, in our examination of the performance of the low-beta 
portfolio and high-beta portfolio, the formation-period betas are estimated using 12 months of 
the CRSP daily return data and rebalanced at the beginning of each July. Consistent with 
Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016), the short-term lagged-component beta (𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3) is estimated 
using daily return data within a lagged three-month period. The regression models are given by 
equations (12) and (13). Particularly, during the third quarter in a year, we use firm betas from 
the second quarter in the prior year because the second quarter in the contemporaneous year falls 
within the period that is used to estimate the formation-period betas. For the first, second, and 
fourth quarters in a year, we estimate 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3 from the immediate preceding quarter. Cederburg and 
O’Doherty (2016) argue that the predictivity of 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3  might be diminished during the third 
quarter. Therefore, our instruments also incorporate a dummy variable that serves as the third-
quarter indicator (𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3}) and an interaction term between the indicator and the short-term lagged-
component beta (𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3} × 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3) to allow for a differential effect. In terms of the long-term lagged-
component beta (𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿36), we use the daily return data over the 36-month period immediately 
preceding the formation period. Following Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016), we require at least 
36 and 450 valid return observations during the three-month and 36-month period to estimate the 
𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3 and 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿36, respectively. 
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Holdings-Based Calendar-Time Portfolios 
To examine the performance of PL insurers’ low-beta portfolio and high-beta portfolio, 
we follow Seasholes and Zhu (2010) and construct holdings-based calendar-time portfolios using 
PL insurers’ stock holding data. The advantage of the holdings-based calendar-time portfolios is 
that they reflect the actual weight of each stock in PL insurers’ holdings. To construct the 
calendar-time portfolios, we first sort PL insurers’ holdings into decile portfolios based on past 
market betas using all listed firms for the break points. Consistent with Cederburg and 
O’Doherty (2016), the formation-period betas are estimated from the prior 12 months (240 
trading days) of the CRSP daily return data following equations (12) and (13). The portfolios are 
rebalanced at the beginning of each July.28 To be included in the break points formation, a firm 
must have at least 150 valid daily return observations over the prior 12 months (240 trading 
days). Following Seasholes and Zhu (2010), when the portfolios are rebalanced, the weights of 
each stock in the decile portfolios are determined by its actual value in the PL insurers’ holdings 
at the beginning of the rebalancing date. Consistent with Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and 
Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016), we regard the first decile portfolio as the low-beta portfolio 
and the last decile portfolio as the high-beta portfolio. Consistent with Cederburg and O’Doherty 
(2016), the PL insurers’ beta decile portfolios are assumed to be held for 12 months before 
                                                 
28 Since the statutory statements of PL insurers provide their stock holdings at the year-end only, the stock holdings 
at the beginning of July are not directly observed. With the assistance of daily transactions data, we convert the year-
end holdings to holdings on each trading day. To complete this conversion, the first step is to get adjusted number of 
shares of each stock in PL insurers’ portfolios. Specifically, after we obtain the data of annual stock holdings and 
stock transactions (discussed in the Data and Sample section), we use the cumulative factor (CFACSHR) provided 
by the CRSP daily stock file to adjust the number of shares held and transacted. The second step is to use a 
retrospective method to get the adjusted number of shares held on each trading day during a year. For example, if 
Allstate holds 1,000 shares of Chubb at the end of 2016 and the only transaction it makes during this year is on 
March 12, 2015, when it buys 500 shares. The retrospective method will assign 1,000 to the number of shares on 
each trading day between March 12, 2015 and December 31, 2015 and assign 500 (i.e., 1,000 − 500) to the number 
of shares on each trading day between January 1, 2015 and March 11, 2015. The last step is to determine the market 
value of stock holdings in each stock using the price that is also adjusted by a cumulative factor (CFACPR) provided 
by the CRSP daily stock file. With PL insurers’ daily holdings data, we can obtain their actual holdings at the 
beginning of July in each year. 
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rebalancing. To calculate the daily returns of each portfolios, we follow Liu and Strong (2008) 
and employ the decomposed buy-and-hold methods29 rather than rebalanced methods to ensure 
that the returns correspond to those realized by a buy-and-hold investor.  
 
Investigation of the Beta-Leverage Relation 
To test H1 and H2, we conduct multivariate regressions of PL insurers’ beta choice on 
their leverage. Since the firm characteristics are observed at the year-end, we choose the year-
end portfolios in testing the role of leverage in determining the beta choice. Consistent with our 
prior analysis, both the unconditional and conditional CAPM are used to estimate the stock beta. 
For the multivariate regressions, we employ three different approaches.  
The first approach uses the value-weighted unconditional and conditional portfolio beta 
(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 and 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴) as the dependent variable. The model is given by 
                                                 
29 Specifically, the daily portfolio return over n-day holding period is given as follows, 
𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,0𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
,                                               𝐶𝐶 = 1           
�
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ,0 ∏ �1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡−1𝑑𝑑=1
∑ [𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,0 ∏ �1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑�]𝑡𝑡−1𝑑𝑑=1𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ,      𝐶𝐶 = 2, … ,𝐶𝐶
                                                
where 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡  represents the portfolio return on day 𝐶𝐶, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ,0  represents the weight of stock 𝑖𝑖  at the beginning of the 
holding period and 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 ) represents the return of stock 𝑖𝑖  on day 𝐶𝐶  (𝑑𝑑 ). Since we construct value-weighted 
portfolios, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,0 can begiven by 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ,0 = 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,0∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,0𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1                                                                                       
where 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,0  is the market value of stock 𝑖𝑖  at the beginning of the holding period. When we compare the 
performance of PL insurers’ low-beta portfolio and their high-beta portfolio, we form a long-short portfolio that is 
long high-beta stocks and short low-beta stocks. Consistent with Liu and Strong (2008), the profits of the long-short 
portfolio are calculated as follows, 
𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 = �𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 ,                                                           𝐶𝐶 = 1           𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡��1 + 𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿,𝑑𝑑� −𝑡𝑡−1
𝑑𝑑=1
𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡��1 + 𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡−1
𝑑𝑑=1
,      𝐶𝐶 = 2, … ,𝐶𝐶                                       
where 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡  represents the profits of the long-short portfolio on day 𝐶𝐶 and 𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡  and 𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡  (𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿,𝑑𝑑  and 𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆,𝑑𝑑) represents the 
long and the short portfolio return on day 𝐶𝐶 (𝑑𝑑), respectively. 
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𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴, or 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀, 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)                        (14) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴  and 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 represent the unconditional portfolio beta and 
conditional portfolio beta, respectively, and 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 represents the leverage. As is discussed in the 
Section 1 (Introduction), we use the firm total leverage which reflects both the insurance 
leverage and financial debt leverage. Following the prior literature, 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 is calculated as the ratio 
of total liabilities to total assets (e.g., Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin, 1999). The regression 
model is the ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The second approach uses the proportion of investment in an unconditional and 
conditional beta decile (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10) and 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10)) as the dependent 
variable. The model is given by 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10), or 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10) = 𝑓𝑓(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀, 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)        (17) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10)  ( 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10) ) represents the proportions of the 
common stock portfolio in stocks with an unconditonal (conditional) beta in the deciles 1, 2, …, 
10, respectively. We employ the Tobit regression model because the values for the proportions 
are bounded between 0 and 1. The likelihood-ratio test suggests that the random-effect model is 
preferable to the pooled model. Thus, the model used in the second approach is the Tobit with 
the random effects.  
The third approach uses the beta bias in each unconditional and conditional beta decile 
(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10) and 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10)) as the dependent variable. Compared to the 
second approach, the advantage of this approach is that it removes the effects of the market 
because the market portfolio is used as the benchmark in the calculation of the beta bias. The 
models are given by 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10) , or 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10) = 𝑓𝑓(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀, 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)           (18) 
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where 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10) (𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10)) represents the beta bias (measured by BB) 
in stocks with an unconditional (conditional) beta in the deciles 1, 2, …, 10, respectively. Since 
the beta bias measures are all bounded, we use the Tobit model. The left-censoring limit is -1, 
and the right-censoring limit (1- wm)/wm, where wm represents the percentage of the market 
portfolio in a beta decile. Again, the likelihood-ratio test favors the random-effect model. So, we 
employ the Tobit regression model with random effects. 
In the finance literature, few studies propose or examine the firm characteristics of 
institutional investors in determining the common stock portfolio constitution. Prior research in 
the portfolio choice (e.g., Massa, Simonov, 2006; Døskeland and Hvide, 2011; Keloharju, 
Knüpfer, and Linnainmaa, 2012) is focused on individual investors because it can observe the 
individuals’ investments and their wealth, income, and demographic characteristics at the same 
time. Therefore, we apply the available controls from the literature on individual investors in our 
multivariate regression analysis. Consistent with Døskeland and Hvide (2011), we control for 
industry experience, gross wealth, income, listing status of the investor’s company, market value 
of the stock portfolio, and portfolio diversification. For PL insurers, the industry experience is 
measured by the firm age (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), which is calculated as natural logarithm of the number of years 
since commencement. The gross wealth is measured by the firm size (𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴), which is calculated 
as the natural logarithm of total net admitted assets. The income is measured by the size of net 
premiums written (𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 ), which is calculated as the natural logarithm of total net 
premiums written. The listing status is measured by a dummy variable (𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶) that is equal to 
1 for a public insurer and 0 for a private insurer. The market value of common stock portfolio 
(𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀) is measured by the natural logarithm of total market value of common stock holdings. 
Portfolio diversification (𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) is measured by the natural logarithm of the number of 
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stocks held by the insurer. Døskeland and Hvide (2011) also control for the number of stocks in 
each class on the market. Because we the use the deciles to classify the stocks on the market and 
number of stocks should be approximately the same across ten beta classes, this variable is 
equivalent to the year fixed effects. Therefore, we include the year fixed effects in our regression 
to control for the number of stocks and the other unidentified market characteristics. 
In the insurance literature, Ho, Lai, and Lee (2013) study and provide several factors that 
can explain PL insurers’ investment risk taking. Consistent Ho, Lai, and Lee (2013), we 
incorporate the organization form, reinsurance usage, long-tail insurance, business line 
diversification, and geographic diversification into the set of control variables. Specifically, the 
organization form is measured by a dummy variable (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻) which is equal to 1 if the insurer 
is a mutual insurer and 0 if the insurer is a stock insurer. Reinsurance usage (𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴) is 
measured by the ratio of premiums ceded to the sum of direct premiums written and reinsurance 
assumed. The weight of long-tail insurance (𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻) is the percentage of net premiums 
written on long-tail lines30. Consistent with Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer 
(2012), we measure the business line diversification (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) by the complement of the 
Herfindahl Index of net premiums written (NPW) across 24 lines of business31. The equation is 
as follows, 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − ∑ �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 �224𝑗𝑗=1                                         (19) 
                                                 
30 Following Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998), long-tail lines consist of: Ocean Marine, Medical Professional 
Liability, International, Reinsurance, Workers’ Compensation, Other Liability, Product Liability, Aircraft, Boiler 
and Machinery, Farmowners Multiple Peril, Homeowners Multiple Peril, Commercial Multiple Peril, and 
Automobile Liability. Short-tail lines include the following: Inland Marine, Financial Guaranty, Earthquake, 
Fidelity, Surety, Burglary and Theft, Credit, Fire and Allied Lines, Mortgage Guaranty, and Automobile Physical 
Damage. 
31 Following Berry-Stölzle et al. (2012), we group similar business lines into 24 distinct lines written by PL insurers: 
Accident and Health, Aircraft, Auto, Boiler and Machinery, Burglary and Theft, Commercial Multiple Peril, Credit, 
Earthquake, Farmowners’ Multiple Peril, Financial Guaranty, Fidelity, Fire and Allied lines, Homeowners’ Multiple 
Peril, Inland Marine, International, Medical Professional Liability, Mortgage Guaranty, Ocean Marine, Other, Other 
Liability, Products Liability, Reinsurance, Surety, and Workers’ Compensation. 
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where 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 denotes the net premiums written by insurer 𝑖𝑖 in line 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,24 in year 𝐶𝐶, and 
𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  denotes the total net premiums written by insurer 𝑖𝑖  in year 𝐶𝐶 . Larger values of  
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represent higher levels of diversification. Consistent with Liebenberg and Sommer 
(2008), the geographic diversification measure (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) is measured by the complement of 
the Herfindahl Index of direct premiums written (DPW) across 58 states and territories32. The 
equation is as follows, 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − ∑ �𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 �258𝑘𝑘=1                                           (20) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 denotes the direct premiums written by an insurer 𝑖𝑖 in state 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,58 in year 𝐶𝐶, 
and 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the total direct premiums written in year t. In addition, because the U.S. 
insurance industry is subject to the state regulations rather than the federal regulations, we also 
include the state fixed effects to control for the potential regulatory effects. 
                                                 
32 The premiums written across states and territories are obtained from Schedule T of the PL insurers’ statutory 
statements.  
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DATA AND SAMPLE 
We obtain the common stock holdings and transactions (i.e., buys and sells) data of PL 
insurers from the NAIC InfoPro database for the years 2001 through 2015. The data cover the 
common stocks of unaffiliated firms33 on Schedule D – Part 2 – Section 2 (Common Stocks 
Owned), Part 3 (Long-Term Bonds and Stocks Acquired), Part 4 (Long-Term Bonds and Stocks 
Sold, Redeemed or Otherwise Disposed Of), and Part 5 (Long Term Bonds and Stocks Acquired 
and Fully Disposed Of) of PL insurers’ annual statutory statements. In our data screen, we first 
delete stock holdings with nonpositive number of shares or fair value and then aggregate the data 
for the same stock on each portfolio date (i.e., year-end) or transaction date. The stock 
information is obtained from the CRSP database. In the last step of data screen, we remove the 
stock holdings that cannot be merged with the CRSP on the last trading day of each year and 
stock transactions that cannot be merged with the CRSP on each transaction date. The detailed 
process of the data screening and the number of observations left following each step are 
presented in panels A, B, and C of Table 1. Our stock holdings sample consists of 966,986 
insurer-stock-year observations, our stock buys sample consists of 980,179 insurer-stock-day 
observations, and our stock sells sample consists of 907,963 insurer-stock-day observations. The 
summary statistics are reported in Table 2. On average, the PL insurers in our sample hold 3,391 
stocks with 3.04 billion shares and $133.83 billion market value in each year. In terms of stock 
buys, the PL insurers, on average, buy 0.91 billion shares for $33.11 billion in each year. In
                                                 
33 The investments in the common stocks of affiliated companies are excluded in our sample because they might 
reflect repurchased shares kept as treasury stock that is available for re-issuance rather than investments. 
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terms of stock sells, the PL insurers, on average, sell 0.87 billion shares for $27.45 billion in each 
year. 
To analyze the effects of leverage on the portfolio beta in the multivariate regressions, we 
also obtain the financial data of PL insurers from the NAIC InfoPro database. Following prior 
literature (e.g., Che and Liebenberg, 2017), we exclude insurers with non-positive total net 
admitted assets, net premiums written, or an organization form other than stock or mutual. Since 
our study focuses on the common stock portfolios of PL insurers, we also exclude insurers with 
non-positive market value of common stock portfolios. Finally, we remove the insurers that do 
not have sufficient information to calculate the variables in the regression analysis. The process 
of the data screening and the number of observations left following each step are presented in 
Panel D of Table 1. We winsorize leverage (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀) and reinsurance (𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴) at the 1st 
and the 99th percentile to reduce the effects of outliers34. Our sample consists of 6,103 insurer-
year observations (818 unique insurers), and, on average, it represents 48.48 (56.47) percent of 
the entire PL industry in terms of total net admitted assets (net premiums written) across all years 
during our sample period.  
In addition, we obtain the risk-free rate, market return, size and value factor from 
Kenneth French’s website35. The data of bond yields for the calculation of the default spread are 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website36. 
 
                                                 
34 We detect outliers using a scatter plot and the Cook’s distance test. Both suggest that there are outliers present in 
the values of our leverage and reinsurance variable. 
35 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
36 See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/. 
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Table 1 
Data Screen 
 
  Screen Criteria 
Number of 
Observations 
Panel A: Stock Holdings 
(i) Obtain PL insurers' stock holdings (unaffiliated) from the NAIC InfoPro database (Schedule D-Part 2-Section 2) (2001-2015). 1,292,954 
(ii) Remove stock holdings with non-positive number of shares or fair value. 1,279,602 
(iii) Aggregate holdings of the same stocks on each portfolio date (year-end) for each PL insurer. 1,184,395 
(iv) Remove stock holdings that cannot be merged with the CRSP database (last trading day in each year). 966,986 
Panel B: Stock Buys 
(i) Obtain PL insurers' stock buys (unaffiliated) from the NAIC InfoPro database (Schedule D-Part 3 and Part 5) (2001-2015). 1,394,770 
(ii) Remove stock buys with non-positive number of shares or actual costs. 1,351,234 
(iii) Aggregate buys of the same stocks on each transaction date for each PL insurer. 1,229,701 
(iv) Remove stocks buys that cannot be merged with the CRSP database on each transaction date. 980,179 
Panel C: Stock Sells 
(i) Obtain PL insurers' stock sells (unaffiliated) from the NAIC InfoPro database (Schedule D-Part 4 and Part 5) (2001-2015). 1,474,635 
(ii) Remove stock sells with non-positive number of shares or adjusted carrying value. 1,417,644 
(iii) Aggregate sells of the same stocks on each transaction date for each PL insurer. 1,150,677 
(iv) Remove stock sells that cannot be merged with the CRSP database on each transaction date. 907,963 
Panel D: Financial Data 
(i) Obtain PL insurers' financial data from the NAIC InfoPro database (2001-2015). 19,371 
(ii) Remove PL insurers with non-positive net admitted assets. 19,370 
(iii) Remove PL insurers with non-positive net premiums written. 17,030 
(iv) Remove PL insurers with non-positive market value of a common stock portfolio. 7,290 
(v) Remove PL insurers that are neither mutuals nor stocks. 6,350 
(vi) Remove PL insurers without sufficient information to calculate the variables in the regression analysis. 6,103 
This table presents the data screenings in our samples. Panels A, B, C, and D report the screen criteria and number of observations in 
the sample of stock holdings, stock buys, stock sells, and financial data, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Stock Holdings and Transactions 
 
  
Num of 
Insurers 
Num of 
Transactions  
(thousand) Num of Stocks 
Num of Shares 
(billion) 
Value 
($ billion) 
Panel A: Stock Holdings 
2001 1,026 n/a 3,551 2.5431 93.9519 
2002 988 n/a 3,198 2.6628 77.7449 
2003 973 n/a 3,208 2.4840 99.3799 
2004 928 n/a 3,262 2.5848 108.6402 
2005 931 n/a 3,326 2.7292 114.8489 
2006 923 n/a 3,387 2.9166 131.9163 
2007 923 n/a 3,285 2.9549 133.3732 
2008 959 n/a 3,122 2.9065 91.2329 
2009 924 n/a 3,405 3.0750 110.9005 
2010 917 n/a 3,331 2.8910 117.4033 
2011 944 n/a 3,290 3.1199 137.2428 
2012 946 n/a 3,332 3.4475 155.1794 
2013 956 n/a 3,448 3.6296 205.7128 
2014 968 n/a 3,826 3.7026 217.9071 
2015 978 n/a 3,887 3.9113 212.0039 
Average 952 n/a 3,391 3.0373 133.8292 
Panel B: Stock Buys 
2001 907 55.8630 3,057 0.9056 29.7453 
2002 865 60.8740 2,868 0.7775 22.4040 
2003 866 54.7860 2,999 0.7457 21.9319 
2004 861 65.7970 3,367 0.9285 28.6405 
2005 864 67.3250 3,297 0.9087 31.3963 
2006 868 77.4340 3,436 1.0939 39.1499 
2007 846 79.8650 3,553 1.0391 38.7013 
2008 900 84.0780 3,218 1.2543 45.2704 
2009 875 66.9350 3,461 1.1011 29.5456 
2010 801 60.6730 3,318 0.7013 23.2221 
2011 857 63.1610 3,453 0.9180 39.3596 
2012 855 53.3860 3,149 0.7554 26.8021 
2013 866 57.2170 3,197 0.9436 42.6676 
2014 875 64.7700 3,836 0.7493 34.9274 
2015 885 68.0150 3,944 0.8886 42.9529 
Average 866 65.3453 3,344 0.9141 33.1145 
Panel C: Stock Sells 
2001 929 53.4780 3,281 0.9449 30.9951 
2002 893 57.8520 3,056 0.8942 25.2857 
2003 874 48.4540 2,878 0.7674 20.5711 
2004 870 57.9250 3,363 0.8565 23.7356 
2005 858 55.0270 3,214 0.8569 25.4368 
2006 864 70.0700 3,405 1.0325 31.9935 
2007 843 77.2220 3,477 0.9917 33.2823 
2008 893 80.1080 3,255 1.2407 37.5198 
2009 869 62.2510 3,260 1.0203 31.3796 
2010 798 54.4810 3,511 0.8620 23.5608 
2011 821 58.5970 3,416 0.7356 21.0198 
2012 817 54.2610 3,252 0.6675 22.4567 
2013 840 56.2290 3,260 0.7942 27.7605 
2014 855 59.8730 3,700 0.7012 28.9575 
2015 847 62.1350 3,625 0.7021 27.7624 
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Average 858 60.5309 3,330 0.8712 27.4478 
This table presents the summary statistics of stock holdings and transactions (i.e., buys and sells) 
of PL insurers. Panels A, B, and C report the stock holdings, buys, and sells, respectively, in each 
year during the sample period (2001-2015) and their averages. 
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PORTFOLIO TILT REGARDING BETA 
As is described in the Section 4 (Empirical Method), we first investigate PL insurers’ 
portfolio beta choice before testing our hypotheses. Specifically, we use the measure of the beta 
bias (BB) to examine whether they tilt their portfolios toward stocks with certain betas. The 
tested assets are the PL insurers’ common stock holdings at the end of each year during our 
sample period. The market portfolio is used as the benchmark, and the break points are the beta 
deciles of the stocks in the market portfolio. Table 3 presents the results from the analysis of the 
beta bias. Panel A reports the beta bias based on the deciles of the unconditional beta. We find 
that the PL insurers exhibit a positive beta bias in the lower beta deciles and a negative beta bias 
in the higher beta deciles. For instance, the means of the beta biases in the first, second, and third 
beta deciles are 21.94, 32.00, and 17.47 percent, respectively, while the means of the beta biases 
in the eighth, ninth, and tenth beta deciles are -7.24, -21.16, and -26.85 percent, respectively. We 
also test the significance of the beta bias in each decile, and the p-values suggest that all beta 
biases are statistically significant except for the beta bias in the fourth decile. Panel B reports the 
beta bias based on the deciles of the conditional beta. The conditional beta is calculated 
following equations (12) and (13) with the CRSP daily return data over the prior 12 months. We 
find that the results stay materially the same. Overall, the PL insurers’ beta bias is negatively 
related to the stock beta, reflecting the portfolio tilt toward low-beta stocks and away from high-
beta stocks. 
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Table 3 
Beta Bias 
 
  wp wm 
Beta Bias (BB) 
(wp-wm)/wm p-value 
Panel A: Unconditional Beta Bias 
1 1.83% 1.47% 21.94% 0.00 
2 9.25% 6.98% 32.00% 0.00 
3 13.60% 11.62% 17.47% 0.00 
4 12.41% 12.50% -0.72% 0.50 
5 13.26% 13.70% -2.56% 0.01 
6 14.04% 13.45% 4.05% 0.00 
7 11.60% 12.12% -4.78% 0.00 
8 10.54% 11.39% -7.24% 0.00 
9 8.04% 9.89% -21.16% 0.00 
10 5.43% 6.87% -26.85% 0.00 
Panel B: Conditional Beta Bias 
1 1.67% 1.44% 19.57% 0.00 
2 6.72% 5.44% 29.38% 0.00 
3 13.52% 11.61% 16.71% 0.00 
4 14.59% 14.08% 3.13% 0.00 
5 14.58% 13.38% 9.03% 0.00 
6 13.27% 12.40% 7.36% 0.00 
7 12.89% 13.10% -1.72% 0.10 
8 10.56% 12.01% -13.24% 0.00 
9 7.51% 10.51% -28.80% 0.00 
10 4.68% 6.02% -24.77% 0.00 
This table presents the beta bias in the stock holdings of PL insurers. Panels A and B report the 
average unconditional and conditional beta biases, respectively. The beta bias (BB) is measured 
by (wp-wm)/wm, where wp represents the percentage of a PL insurer’s portfolio in a beta decile 
and wm represents the percentage of the market portfolio in this beta decile. The significance of 
the mean is tested by a t-test with its p-value reported. The averages of wp and wm are also 
reported. 
 
  
 72 
 
BETA-LEVERAGE RELATION 
To test our hypotheses regarding the beta-leverage relation, we employ the multivariate 
regressions to examine whether levered PL insurers overweight low-beta stocks. The variables 
employed in the multivariate regressions are presented in Table 4, and the summary statistics are 
reported in Table 5. Table 5 shows that the value-weighted unconditional and conditional 
portfolio betas of PL insurers’ common stock portfolios are 0.94 and 0.93, respectively, both of 
which are less than one, implying that PL insurers tilt their portfolio toward low-beta stocks. The 
portfolio betas that we find are close to the value-weighted portfolio beta of Berkshire Hathaway 
(0.91) reported by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). The average leverage in our sample is 0.53, and 
it is also consistent with summary statistics reported by other researchers. For example, Colquitt, 
Sommer, and Godwin (1999) report that the leverage measure has a mean of 0.5840 in their 
sample. 
Before we formally conduct multivariate regressions, we first examine the distribution of 
the value-weighted portfolio beta across leverage deciles. Figure 1 presents the results. Panel A 
exhibits the distribution of the means of the unconditional portfolio beta in each leverage decile. 
We do not observe a negative relation between the portfolio beta and the leverage based on the 
trend of the distribution. Moreover, in the first four leverage deciles, the relation seems to be 
positive. Panel B exhibits the distribution of the medians of the unconditional portfolio beta in 
each leverage decile. We find that while the median of the portfolio beta increases with the 
leverage in the first four deciles of the leverage, the median decreases with the leverage in the 
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last six deciles. Panels C and D exhibit the distribution of the mean and the median of the 
conditional portfolio beta, respectively. While panel C shows an overall positive relation 
between the portfolio beta and the leverage, panel D does not exhibit a significant overall trend. 
Therefore, from the perspective of the univariate distribution, we do not find evidence for PL 
insurers betting against beta. We do note that Panel B might suggest that the relation between the 
portfolio beta and the leverage is non-linear and the negative relation can be observed when the 
leverage is higher. To address this concern, we also conduct the robustness check using the 
piecewise regressions following our main multivariate regressions. 
As is discussed in the Section 4 (Empirical Methods), we employ three different 
approaches in the multivariate regressions to test the relation between the portfolio tilt regarding 
stock beta and the leverage. The first approach uses the value-weighted unconditional and 
conditional portfolio betas (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴  and 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴) as the dependent variable. 
Table 6 reports the results. We find that the coefficient estimate on the leverage is not significant 
across all model specifications. Therefore, the leverage is not a significant predictor for the 
portfolio beta. Instead, we find that the firm size is positively and significantly related to the 
portfolio beta, implying that large PL insurers tend to hold a portfolio with higher market risk. In 
addition, the relation between the portfolio beta and the size of the portfolio is negative and 
significant, suggesting that the PL insurers that hold a larger common stock portfolio tend to 
choose less market risk exposure. Moreover, the portfolio diversification is positively and 
significantly related to the portfolio beta in three out of four models.  
The second approach uses the proportions of investment in an unconditional and 
conditional beta decile (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10) and 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10)) as the dependent 
variable. Panel A in Table 7 presents the results based on the unconditional beta deciles. We find 
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that the leverage is positively and significantly related to the proportion of investment in the last 
beta decile and that it is negatively and significantly related to the proportion of investment in the 
first beta decile, implying a positive relation between the portfolio beta and the leverage. In 
addition, we find that the relation between the proportion of the investment in a middle range of 
the stock beta (i.e., the fourth decile) and the leverage is positive and significant. Panel B in 
Table 7 presents the results based on the conditional beta deciles. We find that the coefficient 
estimate on the leverage is not statistically significant except for the first beta decile. In the first 
beta decile, the coefficient estimate on the leverage is negative and significant, suggesting that 
PL insurers that use more leverage tend to underweight the low-beta stocks.   
The third approach uses the beta bias in each unconditional and conditional beta decile 
(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10) and 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑈𝑈(1, 2, … , 10)) as the dependent variable. Panels A and B 
in Table 8 present the results from the regressions of the beta bias on the leverage in each 
unconditional and conditional beta decile, respectively. We find that the results reported in panel 
A are generally consistent with the panel A in Table 7. Specifically, the beta bias in the last 
decile is positively and significantly related to the leverage, and the beta bias in the first decile is 
negatively and significantly related to the leverage, rejecting the prediction of the BAB strategy. 
In addition, the beta bias in the fourth decile is positively related to the leverage. Panel B shows 
that the coefficient estimate on the leverage is not statistically significant across all conditional 
beta deciles, suggesting that the leverage is unrelated to the PL insurers’ portfolio tilt regarding 
beta.   
As is previously mentioned, it is possible that the negative relation between the portfolio 
beta and the leverage exists only when the leverage is higher. The panel B of Figure 1 suggests 
that the 40th percentile is likely a turning point. We follow Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
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and Wruck (1989) and use the piecewise regressions to identify this possible relation for PL 
insurers with higher leverage. Specifically, the leverage is decomposed into two variables that 
vary in a lower range and a higher range, respectively. The calculation is as follows, 
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃40 = � 0,           𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 < 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒 40𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀,       𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 ≥  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒 40𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀                  (21) 
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃40 = � 0,           𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 ≥ 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒 40𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀,       𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 <  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒 40𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀                  (22) 
We reproduce the results of our multivariate regressions using these two decomposed 
variables for the leverage. If the negative relation between the portfolio beta and the leverage 
exists only in the higher level of leverage, we would expect to find evidence from the coefficient 
on 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃40. However, from the unreported tables, we do not find consistent evidence that 
supports this prediction. 
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Table 4 
Variables and Their Descriptions in Multivariate Analysis of Stock Holdings 
  
Variable Name Variable Description 
UN_PTF_BETA Value-weighted unconditional portfolio beta. 
CO_PTF_BETA Value-weighted conditional portfolio beta. 
UN_PRO_D(1, 2, …, 10) Proportions of the common stock portfolio in stocks with an 
unconditional beta in the deciles 1, 2, …, 10, respectively. 
CO_PRO_D(1, 2, …, 10) Proportions of the common stock portfolio in stocks with a conditional 
beta in the deciles 1, 2, …, 10, respectively. 
UN_BB_D(1, 2, …, 10) Beta biases in stocks with an unconditional beta in the deciles 1, 2, …, 
10, respectively. 
CO_BB_D(1, 2, …, 10) Beta biases in stocks with a conditional beta in the deciles 1, 2, …, 10, 
respectively. 
LEV Leverage, as measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
AGE Firm age, as measured by the natural logarithm of the number of years 
since commencement. 
SIZE Firm size, as measured by the natural logarithm of total net admitted 
assets. 
NPW_SIZE Size of net premiums written, as measured by the natural logarithm of 
total net premiums written. 
PUBLIC Public status, as measured by a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for a 
publicly-traded insurer and 0 for a private insurer. 
PTF_MV Market value of common stock portfolio, as measured by the natural 
logarithm of the total market value of the common stock portfolio. 
PTF_DIV Portfolio diversification, as measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of stocks held by the insurer. 
MUTUAL Organization form, as measured by the dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 for a mutual insurer and 0 for a stock insurer. 
REINSURANCE Reinsurance ratio, as measured by the ratio of premiums ceded to the 
sum of direct premiums written and reinsurance assumed. 
LONG_TAIL Weight of long-tail line insurance, as measured by the percentage of 
net premiums written on long-tail lines. 
LINES_DIV Business line diversification, as measured by the complement of the 
Herfindahl Index of net premiums written across all business lines. 
GEO_DIV Geographic diversification, measured by the complement of 
Herfindahl index of direct premiums written across all U.S. states and 
territories. 
This table reports the variables and their descriptions in the multivariate analysis of stock 
holdings. 
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics for Multivariate Analysis of Stock Holdings 
  
Variable Name N Mean Median Min Max 
Std. 
Dev. 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
UN_PTF_BETA 6,103 0.9419 0.9429 -0.7209 2.3398 0.1612 0.8543 1.0222 
CO_PTF_BETA 6,103 0.9348 0.9380 -1.9031 3.6362 0.2602 0.8258 1.0283 
LEV 6,103 0.5260 0.5516 0.0490 0.8944 0.1852 0.4112 0.6642 
AGE 6,103 3.6386 3.7377 0.0000 5.3706 1.0788 2.8904 4.6444 
SIZE 6,103 17.7603 17.6369 11.5375 23.7304 1.7446 16.5123 18.9793 
NPW_SIZE 6,103 16.5710 16.6633 5.0814 22.1558 2.0058 15.3233 17.9743 
PUBLIC 6,103 0.0426 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2020 0.0000 0.0000 
PTF_MV 6,103 14.6739 14.7490 1.0986 22.1642 2.3509 13.3006 16.2168 
PTF_DIV 6,103 3.1366 3.4012 0.0000 7.3011 1.5367 2.1972 4.1431 
MUTUAL 6,103 0.4444 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4969 0.0000 1.0000 
REINSURANCE 6,103 0.2467 0.1871 0.0000 0.8732 0.2164 0.0767 0.3640 
LONG_TAIL 6,103 0.7007 0.7978 0.0000 1.0000 0.3249 0.6075 0.9605 
LINES_DIV 6,103 0.3493 0.3878 0.0000 0.8537 0.3010 0.0000 0.6470 
GEO_DIV 6,103 0.2963 0.0584 0.0000 0.9676 0.3493 0.0000 0.6261 
This table presents the summary statistics of the sample in the multivariate analysis of stock 
holdings. For parsimony, the summary statistics of the proportions and beta biases of the 
common stock portfolio in stocks in each unconditional or conditional beta decile are omitted, 
and they can be found in Table 3. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of Portfolio Beta on Leverage 
 
 
This figure presents the distribution of insurers’ unconditional and conditional portfolio beta on 
the deciles of their leverage. Panels A and B (C and D) exhibit the distribution of the mean and 
median of unconditional (conditional) portfolio beta, respectively. The horizontal axis represents 
the deciles of the leverage, and the vertical axis represents the mean or median of the 
unconditional or conditional portfolio beta. 
 79 
 
Table 6 
Effects of Leverage on Portfolio Beta 
  
Dependent Variable: Portfolio Beta (UN_PTF_BETA and CO_PTF_BETA) 
Variables 
Unconditional 
Beta 
Unconditional 
Beta 
Conditional 
Beta 
Conditional 
Beta 
INTERCEPT 0.7654*** 0.6215** 0.6756*** 0.4560 
 
(0.0411) (0.2576) (0.0682) (0.4875) 
LEV 0.0046 0.0419 -0.0194 0.0511 
 
(0.0221) (0.0492) (0.0382) (0.0846) 
AGE -0.0033 -0.0063 -0.0086 -0.0105 
 
(0.0047) (0.0162) (0.0079) (0.0262) 
SIZE 0.0175*** 0.0360** 0.0380*** 0.0713** 
 
(0.0058) (0.0178) (0.0102) (0.0321) 
NPW_SIZE -0.0007 -0.0049 -0.0037 -0.0108 
 
(0.0039) (0.0101) (0.0064) (0.0167) 
PUBLIC 0.0001 -0.0032 0.0078 -0.0089 
 
(0.0214) (0.0525) (0.0398) (0.0969) 
PTF_MV -0.0133*** -0.0182*** -0.0304*** -0.0492*** 
 
(0.0038) (0.0067) (0.0074) (0.0124) 
PTF_DIV 0.0108*** 0.0083 0.0263*** 0.0281*** 
 
(0.0032) (0.0051) (0.0058) (0.0094) 
MUTUAL -0.0047 0.0713 -0.0093 0.1385 
 
(0.0085) (0.0573) (0.0144) (0.0951) 
REINSURANCE -0.0344** -0.0266 -0.0703*** -0.0795 
 
(0.0161) (0.0321) (0.0270) (0.0514) 
LONG_TAIL -0.0111 0.0156 -0.0181 -0.0069 
 
(0.0155) (0.0459) (0.0260) (0.0720) 
LINES_DIV -0.0021 0.0303 0.0048 0.0524 
 
(0.0212) (0.0371) (0.0359) (0.0654) 
GEO_DIV 0.0345* -0.0106 0.0544* -0.0301 
 
(0.0178) (0.0422) (0.0313) (0.0715) 
Firm FE No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Line FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.2583 0.5027 0.1217 0.3854 
N. of Obs. 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 
This table presents the results from the regression of portfolio beta on leverage. The dependent 
variable is the unconditional and conditional portfolio beta. The other variables are defined in 
Table 4. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the insurer level. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 7 
Effects of Leverage on Proportion of Investment in Stocks in Each Beta Decile 
 Panel A: Unconditional Beta Deciles 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of portfolio in each unconditional beta decile (UN_PRO_D(1, 2, …, 10)) 
Variables D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
INTERCEPT -0.2726** 0.0148 0.0478 0.0986** -0.0010 0.0101 -0.0510 0.0632 0.0556 -0.0694 
 
(0.1273) (0.0572) (0.0598) (0.0443) (0.0412) (0.0449) (0.0423) (0.0453) (0.0427) (0.0506) 
LEV -0.1218** 0.0188 -0.0316 0.0677*** 0.0060 0.0187 -0.0070 0.0145 -0.0258 0.0476** 
 
(0.0564) (0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0221) (0.0211) (0.0232) (0.0213) (0.0232) (0.0215) (0.0237) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Line FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of Obs. 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 
Panel B: Conditional Beta Deciles 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of portfolio in each conditional beta decile (CO_PRO_D(1, 2, …, 10)) 
Variables D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
INTERCEPT -0.1331 0.0915* 0.1487*** 0.1396*** -0.0680 -0.1103** 0.0907** 0.1111*** -0.0398 -0.1228** 
 
(0.0901) (0.0503) (0.0561) (0.0421) (0.0488) (0.0498) (0.0445) (0.0381) (0.0428) (0.0493) 
LEV -0.0716* 0.0117 0.0412 0.0180 -0.0054 -0.0031 -0.0167 0.0101 0.0034 0.0280 
 
(0.0428) (0.0241) (0.0260) (0.0215) (0.0249) (0.0247) (0.0223) (0.0194) (0.0208) (0.0232) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Line FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of Obs. 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 
This table presents the results from the regression of the proportion of investment stocks in each beta decile on the leverage. The 
dependent variable is the proportion of common stock portfolio in stocks each beta decile. The other variables are defined in Table 4. 
Panels A and B report the results based on the unconditional and conditional beta deciles, respectively. The regression model is Tobit 
with random effects. The left-censoring limit is 0, and the right-censoring limit is 1. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 8 
Effects of Leverage on Beta Bias in Each Beta Decile  
 Panel A: Unconditional Beta Deciles 
Dependent Variable: Beta bias in each unconditional beta decile (UN_BB_D(1, 2, …, 10)) 
Variables D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
INTERCEPT -25.6419** 0.2381 -0.3135 -0.2824 -0.7184** -0.5268 -1.3229*** -0.6720* -1.1705*** -3.2191*** 
 
(10.4244) (1.2305) (0.5397) (0.3785) (0.3113) (0.3504) (0.3448) (0.3860) (0.4354) (0.7839) 
LEV -8.6526* 0.3123 -0.2693 0.6037*** 0.0818 0.0885 -0.0872 0.1011 -0.2576 0.6989* 
 
(4.6865) (0.5817) (0.2474) (0.1884) (0.1602) (0.1795) (0.1740) (0.2004) (0.2166) (0.3702) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Line FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of Obs. 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 
Panel B: Conditional Beta Deciles 
Dependent Variable: Beta bias in each conditional beta decile (CO_BB_D(1, 2, …, 10)) 
Variables D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
INTERCEPT -15.5370* -0.9274 0.2392 0.0894 -1.1329*** -1.9612*** 0.1832 -0.6608** -1.5305*** -4.0516*** 
 
(8.3084) (1.6589) (0.5514) (0.3312) (0.3733) (0.4117) (0.3603) (0.3123) (0.4321) (0.8724) 
LEV -5.7820 0.2816 0.3205 0.1864 -0.0764 0.0661 -0.1400 0.0223 -0.0936 0.6713 
 
(3.9738) (0.8386) (0.2621) (0.1698) (0.1899) (0.2052) (0.1812) (0.1610) (0.2104) (0.4161) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Line FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of Obs. 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 6,103 
This table presents the results from the regressions of the beta bias on the leverage in each beta decile. The dependent variable is the 
unconditional and conditional beta biases in panels A and B, respectively. The regression model is Tobit with random effects. The 
left-censoring limit is -1, and the right-censoring limit (1- wm)/wm, where wm represents the percentage of the market portfolio in a 
beta decile. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. For parsimony, the control variables are 
omitted in this table. 
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PERFORMANCE OF THE BAB STRATEGY 
In the previous section, we find that the PL insurers’ leverage is not negatively related to 
their portfolio beta, suggesting that these institutional investors do not bet against beta. One 
possible explanation is that the BAB strategy is not profitable. So, in this section, we attempt to 
explain why PL insurers do not beta against beta from the perspective of portfolio returns. To 
examine PL insurers’ portfolio returns, we construct the holdings-based calendar-time portfolios, 
which reflect the actual weight of each stock in PL insurers’ holdings. As is discussed in the 
Section 4 (Empirical Methods), we sort PL insurers’ holdings into decile portfolios based on the 
past market beta using all listed firms for the break points. The high-beta portfolio and the low-
beta portfolio are formed at the beginning of July in each year. 
First, we use the one-step IV regressions (IV1) to investigate the performance of these 
portfolios. Table 9 presents the results. “H” represents the high-beta portfolio, “L” represents 
the low-beta portfolio, and “HL” represents their difference, which is equivalent to a portfolio 
that is long high-beta stocks and short low-beta stocks (long-short beta portfolio). Following 
Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016), we conduct regressions in eight cases. For each case, we use 
the Newey-West (1987) corrected t-statistics with a lag of five to statistically assess the portfolio 
performance.  
Case 1 does not incorporate any instruments in its estimation, and thus, the model of case 
1 is the unconditional CAPM. The estimated market beta for the low-beta portfolio is 0.29 
compared to 1.93 for the high-beta portfolio. The unconditional alpha of the low-beta portfolio (-
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0.33 percent per quarter) is greater than that of the high-beta portfolio (-1.57 percent per quarter). 
The long-short beta portfolio generates an unconditional alpha of -1.24 percent per quarter. 
However, the t-statistics indicate that this unconditional alpha is statistically insignificant, 
providing no evidence for Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and other prior literature that finds the 
beta anomaly (e.g., Black, 1972; Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Friend and Blume, 1970; 
Black, 1993; Mehrling, 2005). Therefore, using the holdings-based calendar-time portfolios 
approach, we find that that the low-beta portfolio does not outperform the high-beta portfolio 
even when the unconditional CAPM is used. Consequently, the BAB strategy cannot generate 
positive abnormal returns. 
Case 2 to 8 include the instruments in the one-step IV regressions. They refer to the 
conditional CAPM. Case 2 uses the short-term lagged-component beta (β𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3) as the instrument. 
Based on the case 2, case 3 adds the indicator variable that is equal to one for the third quarter of 
each year and zero otherwise (𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3}) and the interaction between the third quarter indicator and 
the three-month lagged-component beta (𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3} × 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3). Case 4 includes the short-term and long-
term lagged-component beta (β𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3 and β𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿36) in the instrument set. Building on case 4, case 5 
also introduces the third-quarter indicator variable and its interaction with the short-term lagged-
component beta. Case 6 incorporates the dividend yield (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷) and the default spread (𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆) as the 
sole instruments, while case 7 also adds the short-term lagged-component beta. Finally, case 8 
uses the full information set. Through case 2 to 8, we find that consistent with case 1, the 
conditional alpha of the long-short beta portfolio of each case is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, we do not find evidence for the outperformance of the low-beta portfolio in the 
unconditional CAPM, providing support to Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016). In addition, the 
table reports a p-value (𝑝𝑝(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈)) for the one-sided test that the conditional HL alpha (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) is 
 84 
 
less than or equal to the corresponding unconditional alpha (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈). According to the p-values, we 
find that the difference between the unconditional alpha and the conditional alpha is statistically 
insignificant, implying that the unconditional alpha is not biased. 
Second, as is discussed in Section 4 (Empirical Methods), following Cederburg and 
O’Doherty (2016), we also investigate the portfolio performance in the Fama-French model 
because the risk-return relation becomes even flatter after controlling for both size and book-to-
market (Fama and French, 1992 and 2006). Table 10 presents the results from the one-step IV 
regressions using the Fama-French three-factor model. Similar to Table 9, Table 10 reports eight 
cases, in which case 1 refers to the unconditional CAPM and case 2 to 8 refer to the conditional 
CAPM. Consistent with the results in the one-step IV regressions without the size and value 
factor, we find no evidence that the low-beta portfolio outperforms the high-beta portfolio in 
either the unconditional or the conditional CAPM. In addition, the conditional alpha is 
significantly different from the unconditional alpha only in the case 8, implying that the 
unconditional alpha is biased in this case. 
Last, we conduct the two-step IV regressions (IV2) to examine the portfolio performance. 
Table 11 reports the results. Consistent with Table 9 and Table 10, the eight cases in Table 11 
also do not support the beta anomaly. In particular, case 1 indicates that the beta anomaly does 
not exist even in the unconditional CAPM. Again, we find that the difference between the 
conditional alpha and the unconditional alpha is not statistically significant. 
To check the robustness of our results above, we also analyze the performance of the 
high-beta and low-beta portfolios of PL insurers with high (top quartile) and low (bottom quartile) 
leverage individually in two subsamples. From the unreported tables, we find that the results are 
qualitatively the same as those from the overall sample. Taken together, we find no evidence that 
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the PL insurers’ low-beta portfolio outperforms their high-beta portfolio, implying that it does 
not pay to bet against beta. 
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Table 9 
Instrumental Variables Regressions (IV1) 
 
Case   αiIV1 p(αi ≤ αiU) Adj R2 
1 L -0.0033 
 
0.1077 
 
(-0.3104) 
  H -0.0157 
 
0.7484 
 
(-1.2746) 
  HL -0.0124 n/a 
 
 
(-0.8108) 
  2 L -0.0038 
 
0.0937 
 
(-0.3504) 
  H -0.0120 
 
0.7534 
 
(-1.0065) 
  HL -0.0082 0.3257 
 
 
(-0.5303) 
  3 L -0.0044 
 
0.0716 
 
(-0.3904) 
  H -0.0073 
 
0.7760 
 
(-0.6323) 
  HL -0.0029 0.1603 
 
 
(-0.1896) 
  4 L -0.0039 
 
0.0776 
 
(-0.3390) 
  H -0.0119 
 
0.7520 
 
(-0.9880) 
  HL -0.0080 0.3679 
 
 
(-0.5056) 
  5 L -0.0044 
 
0.0544 
 
(-0.3721) 
  H -0.0073 
 
0.7725 
 
(-0.6276) 
  HL -0.0029 0.1672 
 
 
(-0.1841) 
  6 L -0.0030 
 
0.0787 
 
(-0.2862) 
  H -0.0138 
 
0.7686 
 
(-1.4076) 
  HL -0.0109 0.7717 
 
 
(-0.7204) 
  7 L -0.0035 
 
0.0639 
 
(-0.3261) 
  H -0.0126 
 
0.7655 
 
(-1.1921) 
  HL -0.0092 0.5791 
 
 
(-0.5943) 
  8 L -0.0047 
 
0.0227 
 
(-0.4024) 
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H -0.0086 
 
0.7825 
 
(-0.7954) 
  HL -0.0039 0.2965 
   (-0.2497)     
This table presents the results from the one-step IV regressions (IV1) for PL insurers’ decile 
portfolios using all CRSP stocks to determine break points of past market betas. The formation-
period betas are estimated using 12 months of the CRSP daily data, and the portfolios are 
rebalanced at the beginning of each July. “H” represents the high-beta portfolio, “L” represents 
the low-beta portfolio, and “HL” represents their difference (long-short beta portfolio). The 
regression model is as follows, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 + �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for portfolio 𝑖𝑖 over quarter 𝜏𝜏, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 
represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for the market portfolio over quarter 𝜏𝜏, and 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1 represents a 𝑘𝑘 × 1 vector of instruments for portfolio 𝑖𝑖 over quarter 𝜏𝜏. The instruments 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1  include the three-month and 36-month lagged-component betas (𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3 and 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿36 ), an 
indicator variable that is equal to one for the third quarter of each year and zero otherwise (𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3}), 
the interaction between the third quarter indicator and the three-month lagged-component beta 
(𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3} × 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3), the log dividend yield (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷), and the default spread (𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆). Following Cederberg 
and O’Doherty (2016), the results of eight cases are reported. Case 1 refers to the unconditional 
CAPM, and cases 2 to 8 refer to the conditional CAPM. The New-West (1987) corrected t-
statistics with a lag length equal to five are reported in the parentheses. For each conditional 
model, the table also reports a p-value (𝑝𝑝(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈)) for the one-sided test that the conditional 
HL alpha (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) is less than or equal to the corresponding unconditional alpha (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈). 
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Table 10 
Fama-French Model Regressions 
 
  
Case   αiIV1 p(αi ≤ αiU) Adj R2 
1 L -0.0035 
 
0.0831 
 
(-0.3109) 
  H -0.0173* 
 
0.7957 
 
(-1.7597) 
  HL -0.0138 n/a 
 
 
(-0.9525) 
  2 L -0.0043 
 
0.0406 
 
(-0.3457) 
  H -0.0141 
 
0.7991 
 
(-1.3684) 
  HL -0.0098 0.4387 
 
 
(-0.6564) 
  3 L -0.0054 
 
-0.0683 
 
(-0.3696) 
  H -0.0112 
 
0.8169 
 
(-0.8418) 
  HL -0.0058 0.3504 
 
 
(-0.3567) 
  4 L -0.0042 
 
-0.0146 
 
(-0.3057) 
  H -0.0139 
 
0.7957 
 
(-1.4601) 
  HL -0.0097 0.4575 
 
 
(-0.6261) 
  5 L -0.0059 
 
-0.1347 
 
(-0.3674) 
  H -0.0106 
 
0.8089 
 
(-0.7956) 
  HL -0.0047 0.3063 
 
 
(-0.2695) 
  6 L -0.0045 
 
0.1443 
 
(-0.3652) 
  H -0.0100 
 
0.7911 
 
(-0.6740) 
  HL -0.0055 0.3615 
 
 
(-0.3369) 
  7 L -0.0055 
 
0.1156 
 
(-0.3583) 
  H -0.0090 
 
0.7918 
 
(-0.6449) 
  HL -0.0035 0.2948 
 
 
(-0.2010) 
  8 L -0.0108 
 
0.0087 
 
(-0.5340) 
  H -0.0009 
 
0.8324 
 
(-0.0498) 
  HL 0.0099 0.0640 
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  (0.5335)     
This table presents the results from the one-step IV regressions (IV1) using the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model for PL insurers’ decile portfolios using all CRSP stocks to determine 
break points of past market betas. The formation-period betas are estimated using 12 months of 
the CRSP daily data, and the portfolios are rebalanced at the beginning of each July. “H” 
represents the high-beta portfolio, “L” represents the low-beta portfolio, and “HL” represents 
their difference (long-short beta portfolio). The regression model is as follows, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1𝜆𝜆 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 + �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1𝜃𝜃 �𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏 + (𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1𝜂𝜂 )𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆,𝜏𝜏+ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for portfolio 𝑖𝑖 over quarter 𝜏𝜏, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 
represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for the market portfolio over quarter 𝜏𝜏 , 
𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏 represent the quarterly size factor return over quarter 𝜏𝜏, 𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆,𝜏𝜏  represents the quarterly 
value factor return over quarter 𝜏𝜏 , and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1  represents a 𝑘𝑘 × 1  vector of instruments for 
portfolio 𝑖𝑖 over quarter 𝜏𝜏. The instruments 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1 include the three-month and 36-month lagged-
component betas (𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3and 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿36), an indicator variable that is equal to one for the third quarter 
of each year and zero otherwise (𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3}), the interaction between the third quarter indicator and the 
three-month lagged-component beta (𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3} × 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3), the log dividend yield (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷), and the default 
spread (𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆). Following Cederberg and O’Doherty (2016), the results of eight cases are reported. 
Case 1 refers to the unconditional CAPM, and cases 2 to 8 refer to the conditional CAPM. The 
New-West (1987) corrected t-statistics with a lag length equal to five are reported in the 
parentheses. For each conditional model, the table also reports a p-value (𝑝𝑝(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈)) for the 
one-sided test that the conditional HL alpha (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ) is less than or equal to the corresponding 
unconditional alpha (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈). 
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Table 11 
Instrumental Variables Regressions (IV2) 
 
Case   αiIV2 p(αi ≤ αiU) Adj R2 
1 L -0.0033 
 
0.1077 
 
(-0.3104) 
  H -0.0157 
 
0.7484 
 
(-1.2746) 
  HL -0.0124 n/a 
 
 
(-0.8108) 
  2 L -0.0038 
 
0.0937 
 
(-0.3504) 
  H -0.0120 
 
0.7534 
 
(-1.0065) 
  HL -0.0082 0.3257 
 
 
(-0.5303) 
  3 L -0.0041 
 
0.0969 
 
(-0.3774) 
  H -0.0131 
 
0.7665 
 
(-1.1011) 
  HL -0.0089 0.4416 
 
 
(-0.5924) 
  4 L -0.0033 
 
0.0929 
 
(-0.2993) 
  H -0.0121 
 
0.7532 
 
(-1.0097) 
  HL -0.0088 0.3819 
 
 
(-0.5709) 
  5 L -0.0033 
 
0.0940 
 
(-0.3025) 
  H -0.0132 
 
0.7657 
 
(-1.1041) 
  HL -0.0099 0.5580 
 
 
(-0.6561) 
  6 L -0.0033 
 
0.0921 
 
(-0.3112) 
  H -0.0136 
 
0.7539 
 
(-1.2531) 
  HL -0.0102 0.4768 
 
 
(-0.6685) 
  7 L -0.0033 
 
0.0932 
 
(-0.3018) 
  H -0.0115 
 
0.7582 
 
(-1.0507) 
  HL -0.0082 0.3416 
 
 
(-0.5345) 
  8 L -0.0034 
 
0.0949 
 
(-0.3099) 
  H -0.0121 
 
0.7662 
 
(-1.0815) 
  HL -0.0087 0.3643 
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  (-0.5797)     
This table presents the results from the two-step IV regressions (IV2) for PL insurers’ decile 
portfolios using all CRSP stocks to determine break points of past market betas. The formation-
period betas are estimated using 12 months of the CRSP daily data, and the portfolios are 
rebalanced at the beginning of each July. “H” represents the high-beta portfolio, “L” represents 
the low-beta portfolio, and “HL” represents their difference (long-short beta portfolio). The first 
stage model is as follows, 
?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,1′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 
where ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏  represents the estimated quarterly portfolio beta for portfolio 𝑖𝑖  over quarter 𝜏𝜏  and 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1 represents a 𝑘𝑘 × 1 vector of instruments for portfolio 𝑖𝑖 over quarter 𝜏𝜏. The instruments 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−1  include the three-month and 36-month lagged-component betas (𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3 and 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿36 ), an 
indicator variable that is equal to one for the third quarter of each year and zero otherwise (𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3}), 
the interaction between the third quarter indicator and the three-month lagged-component beta 
(𝐼𝐼{𝑄𝑄3} × 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3), the log dividend yield (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷), and the default spread (𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆). The fitted betas from 
this regression, 𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏, are used in the second-stage return regression. The second stage model is as 
follows, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼2 + �𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖,1𝛽𝛽�𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for portfolio 𝑖𝑖 over quarter 𝜏𝜏 and 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝜏𝜏 represents the quarterly buy-and-hold excess return for the market portfolio over quarter 𝜏𝜏. 
Following Cederberg and O’Doherty (2016), the results of eight cases are reported. Case 1 refers 
to the unconditional CAPM, and cases 2 to 8 refer to the conditional CAPM. The New-West 
(1987) corrected t-statistics with a lag length equal to five are reported in the parentheses. For 
each conditional model, the table also reports a p-value (𝑝𝑝(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈)) for the one-sided test that 
the conditional HL alpha (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) is less than or equal to the corresponding unconditional alpha (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈). 
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CONCLUSION 
The beta anomaly is one of the most widely documented anomalies in the asset pricing 
literature (e.g., Black, 1972; Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Friend and Blume, 1970; Black, 
1993; Mehrling, 2005). Based on the beta anomaly, Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) propose the 
betting-against-beta (BAB) strategy which argues that it pays to apply leverage and tilt toward 
low-beta stocks and that investors who use leverage should tilt their portfolios toward low-beta 
stocks. They also provide anecdotal evidence that the portfolio beta choice of investors in the 
real world is consistent with the prediction of the BAB strategy. However, the beta anomaly is 
challenged by Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016). They find that the differences in conditional 
alphas across beta portfolios are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the conditional CAPM 
can resolve the beta anomaly. Given the theoretical basis for the BAB is undermined by the 
conditional CAPM, the relation between the portfolio tilt toward low-beta stocks and the 
leverage remains inconclusive.  
In this study, we investigate the proposition of the BAB strategy regarding the relation 
between the portfolio beta and leverage using the U.S. property-liability (PL) insurance 
companies’ common stock holdings. Through our empirical analysis, we find that the PL 
insurers’ portfolio beta choice is not negatively related to their leverage, suggesting that they do 
not bet against beta. In addition, we explore the explanation by examining the performance of PL 
insurers’ low-beta and high-beta portfolios with a holdings-based calendar-time portfolio 
approach. We find that the differences in neither unconditional alphas nor conditional alphas
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across the beta portfolios are statistically significant, implying that the PL insurers’ low-beta 
portfolio does not outperform their high-beta portfolio. Overall, the results in our study indicate 
that the BAB does not exist. 
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ESSAY III  
EFFECTS OF MARKET CONCENTRATION ON CASH HOLDINGS: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY  
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INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of literature indicates that important corporate decisions are influenced 
by market concentration (e.g., Harris, 1998; DeFond and Park, 1999; Botosan and Harris, 2000; 
Fee and Thomas, 2004; Hou and Robinson, 2006; Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2007; Kale 
and Shahrur, 2007; Karuna, 2007). In particular, many studies have shown that market 
concentration plays an important role in shaping a firm’s cash holdings policy (e.g., Haushalter, 
Klasa, and Maxwell, 2007; Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala, 2014). However, there is 
considerable theoretical and empirical disagreement as to both how and why market 
concentration affects corporate cash holdings. In this article, we investigate this relation in the 
U.S. property-liability insurance industry and attempt to reconcile competing theoretical 
predictions and conflicting empirical evidence in the prior literature. The unique reporting 
requirements in the insurance industry grant us several natural advantages to avoid the well-
known public firm bias and segment reporting biases that are present in previous studies. They 
also provide us with highly disaggregated state-line data, which make a more refined measure of 
market concentration possible. 
Theory suggests that market concentration affects cash holdings due to predation risk and 
financial constraints. The predation risk theory implies that cash holdings provide an important 
source of financial flexibility that helps firms mitigate the risk of losing investment opportunities 
and market share to rivals (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell, 
2007). Given that predation is more likely to occur in more oligopolistic industries (e.g., Froot,
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Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Kovenock and Phillips, 1997; Zingales, 1998), the predation risk 
theory implies that market concentration is positively related to cash holdings. The financial 
constraint theory argues that market competition reduces the profitability of assets in place and 
thus increases the risk that firms cover their unexpected operating losses by raising capital 
(Morellec, Nikolov, and Zucchi, 2014). Due to the higher cost of external capital, cash holdings 
become more valuable as competition increases. Since competition is less intensive in a more 
concentrated market, the financial constraint theory implies a negative relation between cash 
holdings and market concentration.  
Empirically, Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) find that firms hold more cash in a 
more concentrated market, supporting the prediction of their predation risk theory. Alternatively, 
Morellec, Nikolov, and Zucchi (2014) show that market concentration is negatively related to the 
cash holdings of a firm, providing support for their financial constraint-based theory. As 
evidenced by the competing theoretical predictions and conflicting empirical findings37 in the 
literature, the role played by market concentration in determining a firm’s cash holdings policy is 
still inconclusive. We believe the U.S. property-liability insurance industry is an ideal setting to 
investigate the relation between market concentration and cash holdings due to regulatory 
reporting requirements that are not otherwise present in other industries. 
First, we benefit from the richness of the insurance statutory data because all licensed 
insurers (both private and public) are required to file their statutory statements on an annual basis, 
and thus, we are able to compute market concentration measures based on all firms in this 
industry. By contrast, prior empirical work has focused almost exclusively on publicly-traded 
                                                 
37 A strand of closely related literature is focused on the effects of market concentration on the value of cash 
holdings. Their evidence is also mixed. For example, Alimov (2014) shows that the relation between the value of 
cash holdings and market concentration is negative. However, Chi and Su (2016) report that different Herfindahl 
indices (HHIs) give different value implications for cash holdings, and the negative and significant relation is 
constrained to only a limited set of concentration measures. 
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firms that are required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to file annual 
statements. Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2009) reexamine previous studies that use Compustat-based 
industry concentration measures, which exclude data on private firms, and find that these are 
poor measures of market concentration. They also show that the significant results reported by 
previous studies are attributable to these measures proxying for other industry characteristics that 
are correlated with their dependent variables rather than a real economic relation. Therefore, with 
data available for all firms in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry, we are able to avoid 
the “public firm bias” warned of by Ali, Klasa, and Yueng (2009). 
Second, unlike managers of unregulated firms who exercise considerable discretion in 
segment-level revenue allocation, managers of insurers do not need to exercise discretion in 
revenue allocation as revenue (i.e., premiums) is directly linked to specific lines of business. 
Therefore, our study avoids the well-known segment reporting biases (i.e., minimum unit size, 
self-reporting errors, and ad-hoc categorization by management) that affect business segment 
disclosure by unregulated firms.38  
Third, insurers are required to report their highly disaggregated premium (revenue) data, 
while firms in unregulated industries are not required to provide data in such detail. Specifically, 
insurers’ statutory statements have a unique section (i.e., “Exhibit of Premiums and Losses 
(Statutory Page 14)”) that reports the data for each line of business within each state. They 
provide us with the most disaggregated data in a bi-dimensional space, implying that we are able 
to observe an insurer’s business in each state-line combination. 39  Therefore, we can more 
accurately identify an insurer’s market space and compute a more accurate measure of market 
concentration than prior studies that use concentration measures based on primary SIC codes.  
                                                 
38 For more detail, see Villalonga (2004) and Botosan and Stanford (2005). 
39 For instance, we are able to directly observe the dollar amount of premiums written by a given insurer in the 
commercial automobile insurance line in Texas or in the homeowners’ line in California. 
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Taking advantage of the unique reporting requirements discussed above, we investigate 
the relation between cash holdings policy and market concentration in the U.S. property-liability 
insurance industry. We propose a refined market concentration measure, market space weighted 
concentration, which more accurately reflects a firm’s state-line market space. Through our 
empirical analysis, we provide evidence in support of the predation risk theory. Specifically, 
insurers exposed to higher market concentration tend to hold a larger cash balance. In addition, 
we examine whether higher cash holdings are used to hedge predation risk. We find that an 
increase in cash holdings is associated with faster future growth when market concentration is 
higher, providing further support for the predation risk theory. We also show that this effect is 
significant only when cash holdings are below the target level, implying that excessive cash 
holdings are not optimal.  
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we help to resolve the previous 
dispute about the relation between market concentration and cash holdings policy. Second, we 
propose a refined measure of market concentration by which a firm’s state-line market space can 
be more accurately captured.  
Our article is clearly distinct from the other studies on cash holdings in the insurance 
literature. In one of the earliest papers in the insurance literature, Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin 
(1999) investigate the determinants of cash holdings by property-liability insurers and identify 
multiple factors that play an important role in shaping an insurer’s cash holdings policy. Hsu, 
Huang, and Lai (2015) study the role played by the board and the finance committee in the cash 
holdings of U.S. property-liability insurers. They find that insurers with a higher proportion of 
outsiders on the board and the financial committee tend hold more cash. Most recently, Xie, 
Wang, Zhao, and Lu (2017) investigate the difference in cash holdings between publicly-traded 
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insurers and private insurers and find that public insurers tend to hold less cash than private stock 
insurers.40 While these prior studies examine the effects of corporate governance, listing status, 
and other factors on insurers’ cash holdings, we focus on the role of market concentration in 
shaping their cash holdings policy and find that the cash holding decision is also significantly 
related to market concentration. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first present our hypotheses. 
Next, we describe the empirical methods employed to test our hypotheses and then describe our 
data and sample. Finally, we present and discuss our results, followed by our conclusion. 
                                                 
40 Their findings differ from the prior literature for non-financial firms which finds the opposite (e.g., Gao, Harford, 
and Li, 2013; Acharya and Xu, 2017). They argue that public insurers hold less cash because they have a smaller 
precautionary demand for cash due to their access to equity capital. 
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Predation Risk Theory 
The first strand of theories regarding the relation between market concentration and cash 
holdings propose that a firm’s cash holding policy is influenced by predation risk (e.g., Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1990; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell, 
2007). When a firm cannot fully take advantage of its investment opportunities, it risks losing 
not only these opportunities but also market share to its rivals (Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell, 
2007). A firm’s ability to finance investments with internal funds is a key determinant of its 
product market success because the internal funds can mitigate predation risk (Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1990). Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) formalize the “long-purse” (or “deep-pockets”) 
theory of predation risk and argue that cash holdings grant a firm financial flexibility in the 
product markets to effectively counter predatory threats by its rivals or prevent entry of new 
competitors. Previous literature has shown that cash holdings are an effective risk management 
tool of predation risk (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, Williamson , 1999; Harford, Mikkelson, and 
Partch, 2003; Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004). For 
example, Opler et al., (1999) find that firms with strong growth opportunities and riskier cash 
flows hold a larger cash balance. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) show that firms with high 
financing costs and more growth opportunities hold more cash to reduce underinvestment 
problems. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) find that financially constrained firms hold 
more cash during recessions. 
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Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) further propose that a firm’s exposure to predation 
risk is determined by the interdependence of its investment opportunities with its product market 
competitors. Specifically, a firm with greater investment opportunity interdependence with its 
rivals is exposed to higher predation risk. Consistent with the proposition of Froot, Scharfstein, 
and Stein (1993), Kovenock and Phillips (1997) and Zingales (1998) both find that predation is 
more likely to occur in more oligopolistic industries in which the interdependence is more 
prominent. Thus, Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) argue that firms exposed to high 
market concentration are expected to hold more cash to manage the predation risk. In their 
empirical test, they find consistent evidence that cash holdings increase with market 
concentration. Following their study, we argue that higher market concentration indicates greater 
interdependence of investment opportunities,41 which induce higher predation risk. Therefore, 
we expect that insurers hold more (less) cash in a more (less) concentrated market. The 
hypothesis can be presented as follows, 
Hypothesis 1 (Predation Risk Hypothesis): Market concentration is positively related to 
cash holdings. 
 
Financial Constraint Theory 
Morellec, Nikolov, and Zucchi (2014) argue that market competition has an impact on 
cash holdings through financial constraints. To illustrate this relation, they develop a dynamic 
model of cash management and propose their financial constraint-based theory. In their model, 
firms are exposed to financing constraints and external financing is costly. Their model 
                                                 
41  Investment opportunities may include product or geographic expansion through either organic growth or 
acquisitions, and cash holdings can be used to take advantage of these opportunities when they emerge (Hsu, Huang 
and Lai, 2015; Xie et al., 2017). 
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demonstrates that the profitability of assets in place decreases with the intensity of the market 
competition. Therefore, compared to firms in a less competitive market, firms in a more 
competitive market have a greater demand for raising funds in order to cover their potential 
losses and avoid inefficient closure (e.g., liquidating assets at discounts). In other words, firms 
exposed to higher market competition are more likely to face financing difficulties. Since 
external capital is more expensive than internal capital, cash holdings are more valuable for firms 
in a highly competitive market, and the optimal level of cash holdings should increase with the 
intensity of market competition. Given that market concentration can be viewed as a proxy for 
market competition, the financial constraint-based theory suggests a negative relation between 
cash holdings and market concentration. 42  Morellec, Nikolov, and Zucchi (2014) also 
empirically test their financial constraint theory and find that cash holdings are negatively related 
to market concentration. Taken together, in our setting, the financial constraint theory implies 
that insurers should hold more (less) cash in a less (more) concentrated market. This hypothesis 
is stated as follows, 
Hypothesis 2 (Financial Constraint Hypothesis): Market concentration is negatively 
related to cash holdings. 
                                                 
42 Economists have long used market concentration as a proxy for product market competition (e.g., Valta, 2012; 
Hoberg and Phillips, 2010a; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010b; Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala, 2014). The greater market 
concentration, the less competitive the product market. 
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EMPIRICAL METHODS 
To examine the relation between market concentration and cash holdings, we first follow 
the empirical method in Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999) and Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015) 
and employ the linear regression model as our baseline model. The model is shown as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)                      (1) 
 
Cash Holding Measure 
Consistent with Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999) and Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015), 
an insurer’s cash holdings (CASH) are measured by the ratio of cash and short-term investments 
to total invested assets. 
 
Market Concentration Measure 
In the insurance literature, researchers use different measures to measure market 
concentration. For example, Shim (2017) employs the industry Herfindahl index (HHI) and 
industry concentration ratios to gauge the market concentration. Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) 
and Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer (2012) measure market concentration 
exposed by an insurer by its weighted average of business line-specific Herfindahl indexes. For 
an insurer that writes homeowners’ insurance in Mississippi, the industry-wide concentration 
measures used by Shim (2017) capture exposure to market concentration in the entire U.S.
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property-liability insurance industry, and the business line weighted concentration measure used 
by Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and Berry-Stölzle et al., (2012) captures exposure to market 
concentration in the entire U.S. homeowners’ insurance market. In this study, we attempt to 
improve the existing measures and capture an insurer’s exposure to market concentration in its 
exact state-line market space (e.g., the homeowners’ insurance in Mississippi in the above 
example). Taking advantage of the detailed data reported for each business line within each state 
from the U.S. property-liability insurance industry, we propose a market concentration measure, 
which we refer to as market space weighted concentration. Our measure offers the most accurate 
reflection of market concentration to which an insurer is exposed because it provides the 
narrowest definition of a market that is possible using insurers’ statutory statements. To illustrate, 
we present the state-line market space of Donegal Insurance Group in 2015 in Figure 1. Figure 1 
shows that Donegal underwrites in only 11 out of 22 lines and 21 out of 56 states and 
territories.43 This illustration is a fair representation of what is observed in the U.S. PL insurance 
industry – firms write business in various lines and states and concentration varies considerably 
across geographic location, lines, and insurers. 
The “Exhibit of Premiums and Losses (Statutory Page 14)" in the statutory statements of 
the U.S. property-liability insurance companies provides detailed data of direct premiums written 
on each business line within each state. We follow Berry-Stölzle et al., (2012) and combine 
similar lines of business to create a total of 22 unique lines. 44 Building on the business line 
                                                 
43 The 56 States and territories include the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, America Samoa, Guam, Puerto 
Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. 
44 Consistent with Berry-Stölzle et al., (2012), we aggregate similar business lines and identify 22 distinct lines that 
are written by property-liability insurers: (1) accident and health, (2) aircraft, (3) auto, (4) boiler and machinery, (5) 
burglary and theft, (6) commercial multiple peril, (7) credit, (8) earthquake, (9) farmowners’ multiple peril, (10) 
financial guaranty, (11) fidelity, (12) fire and allied lines, (13) homeowners’ multiple peril, (14) inland marine, (15) 
medical professional liability, (16) mortgage guaranty, (17) ocean marine, (18) other, (19) other liability, (20) 
products liability, (21) surety, and (22) workers’ compensation. We report two fewer distinct lines than Berry-
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weighted concentration measure (WCONC) used by Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and Berry-
Stölzle et al., (2012), the market space weighted concentration (MS_WCONC) is calculated as 
follows, 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ �𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 �2𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=1                                                  (2) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                            (3) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡22𝑗𝑗=156𝐵𝐵=1                                   (4) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 is the direct premiums written by insurer i in line j in state s at year t, 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 
is the total direct premiums written in line j in state s at year t, and 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the total direct 
premiums written by insurer i at year t. The number of insurers that have business in line j in 
state s at year t is represented as 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 . 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡  represents the Herfindahl index of direct 
premiums written for line j in state s at year t. 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 represents the weight of insurer i’s business 
in line j in state s at year t.  
We also create an alternative version of market space weighted concentration (MS_WC4) 
using the four-firm concentration ratio to measure the market concentration in each state-line 
segment. 45 The calculation is as follows, 
𝐶𝐶4𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡),𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡4𝑖𝑖=1 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡                                                (5) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                            (6) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶4𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡22𝑗𝑗=156𝐵𝐵=1                                     (7) 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stölzle et al., (2012) because the “Exhibit of Premiums and Losses (Statutory Page 14)” does not report information 
for “international” or “reinsurance” lines of business.  
45 The concentration ratio has been widely used in the literature (e.g., Montgomery, 1985; Chidambaran, Pugel, and 
Saunders, 1997; Bajtelsmit and Bouzouita, 1998; Pope and Ma, 2008; Shim, 2017; Bayar et al., 2018). 
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where 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡),𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 is the direct premiums written by the top-four largest insurers i in 
line j in state s at year t, 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 is the total direct premiums written in line j in state s at year t, 
𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 is the direct premiums written by insurer i in line j in state s at year t, and 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is 
the total direct premiums written by insurer i at year t. 𝐶𝐶4𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡  represents the four-firm 
concentration ratio of direct premiums written for line j in state s at year t. 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝑡 represents the 
weight of insurer i’s business in line j in state s at year t. A higher value for both the 
MS_WCONC and MS_WC4 variables is indicative of a greater level of market concentration 
and thus a lower level of market competition.  
 
Control Variables  
Variables in Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999): We include the standard control 
variables specified by Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999) in our models. The determinants of 
cash holdings in their study include firm size (SIZE), financial strength (FIN_STREN), group 
status (GROUP), volatility of cash flows (VOL_CF), duration of liabilities (DURATION), 
ownership structure (STOCK), leverage (LEVERAGE), investment opportunities (INV_OPT), 
non-invested assets (NON_INV_AT), and common stock holdings (COM_STOCK).46 
Firm Age: Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015) argue that older firms are able to generate more 
cash. Therefore, we expect a positive relation between firm age and cash holdings. Because the 
volatility of cash flows (VOL_CF) is measured as the standard deviation of net cash flows from 
operations over the previous five years, we follow Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015) and measure firm 
                                                 
46 The motivations for these variables are presented on pages 404-409 in Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999). 
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age (AGE) by the natural logarithm of the difference between an insurer's age and five.47 For an 
insurance group, the age is based on the age of its oldest affiliate (Berry-Stölzle et al., 2012). 
Dividends: According to Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015), insurers that pay dividends will 
have less cash.48 Therefore, we expect a negative relation between dividend payments and cash 
holdings. Because we analyze the cash holdings for both mutual and stock insurers, we consider 
dividend payments to stockholders and policyholders. We measure the dividend payment 
through the inclusion of a dummy variable (DIVIDEND) that is equal to 1 for an insurer that 
pays a cash dividend to its stockholders or policyholders in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
Public Status: Xie, Wang, Zhao, and Lu (2017) summarize two strands of literature that 
predict differences in cash holdings between public firms and private firms. In terms of the 
precautionary motive of cash holdings, prior literature argues that compared to private firms, 
public firms have better access to the equity capital markets and they can also raise debt capital 
at a lower cost (e.g., Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998; Brau and Fawcett, 2006; Xie, 2010; 
Saunders and Steffen, 2011). Therefore, public (private) firms are expected to have a lower 
(higher) precautionary demand for cash holdings. However, many studies show that agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers are less prevalent among private firms because 
private firms are closely held, they often have large lenders, and their ownership is less dispersed 
(e.g., Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000; Badertscher, Shroff, and White, 2013; Gao, Harford, and Li, 
2013; Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015). Collectively, the relation between public 
status and cash holdings is indeterminate. We measure the public status by including a dummy 
variable (PUBLIC) that is equal to 1 for publicly-traded insurers and 0 for private insurers. 
                                                 
47 As a robustness check, we also calculate firm age without subtracting five. The results are materially similar to 
those presented in this paper. 
48 Dividend paying firms requiring access to liquid assets may do so by reducing dividend payments. This allows 
these firms to hold less cash than firms that do not pay dividends (Opler et al., 1999).  
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Reinsurance: According to Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999), riskier insurers have a 
greater demand for cash holdings. Cole and McCullough (2006) argue that insurers purchase 
reinsurance to shift risk to reinsurers, thus reducing underwriting risk and the probability of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, a negative relation is expected between the use of reinsurance and cash 
holdings. Following Cole and McCullough (2006), reinsurance usage (REINSURANCE) is 
measured by the ratio of premiums ceded to the sum of direct premiums written and reinsurance 
assumed. 
Catastrophe Risk: Insurers with a higher exposure to catastrophe risk have a higher 
demand for cash for precautionary reasons. Therefore, a positive relation is expected between 
cash holdings and catastrophe risk. Following Gron (1999), we measure insurers’ exposure to 
catastrophe risk (CATASTROPHE) by the percentage of premiums that are written in property 
lines in the southern and eastern coastal areas. 49 
Diversification: Duchin (2010) finds that diversified firms hold less precautionary cash 
than focused firms because both the investment opportunities and the cash flows of diversified 
firms’ divisions are not perfectly correlated. So, in our study, we control for insurers’ 
diversification extent by including both their business lines diversification (LINES_DIV) and 
their geographic diversification (GEO_DIV). Following Berry-Stölzle et al., (2012), we use the 
complement of the Herfindahl index of net premiums written (NPW) across all lines of business 
to measure insurers’ business line diversification.50 This measure is calculated as follows, 
                                                 
49 Consistent with Gron (1999), the property lines include automobile physical damage, commercial multiple peril, 
earthquake, farmowners’ multiple peril, fire and allied lines, homeowners’ multiple peril, and inland marine. The 
southern and eastern coastal areas include the following states: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. 
50 Net premiums written (NPW) represents premiums after consideration of the impact of reinsurance on direct 
premiums written. NPW more precisely captures the exposure an insurer has to a given line or market following 
reinsurance transactions.  
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𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − ∑ �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 �224𝑗𝑗=1                                           (8) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 denotes the net premiums written by insurer 𝑖𝑖 in line 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,24 in year 𝐶𝐶, and 
𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the total net premiums written by insurer 𝑖𝑖 in a given year 𝐶𝐶.51 Larger values of  
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  represent greater levels of diversification. Following Liebenberg and Sommer 
(2008), we use the complement of the Herfindahl index of direct premiums written (DPW) 
across 58 states and territories as the geographic diversification measure. 52 Our measure of 
geographic diversification is calculated as follows, 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1 − ∑ �𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 �258𝑘𝑘=1                                           (9) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 denotes the direct premiums written by an insurer 𝑖𝑖 in state 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,58 in year 𝐶𝐶, 
and 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the total direct premiums written in a given year t.  
Year, State, and Line Fixed Effects: Our data sample spans from 1999 to 2015. During 
this period, there are substantial fluctuations in both financial markets and insurance markets. 
For example, our sample includes the 2001 terrorist attacks, the 2005 losses from hurricanes 
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Thus, we add year fixed effects to 
control for changes in cash holdings due to the changing conditions of financial markets and 
insurance markets. In addition, since the insurance industry is regulated at the state level, we 
include state fixed effects to control for state-specific differences in regulatory stringency. 53 
                                                 
51  Data necessary for the calculation of the 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶_𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  variable are obtained from the “Underwriting and 
Investment Exhibit (Part 1B – Premiums)” section of the NAIC annual statement, which allows for the inclusion of 
both the “reinsurance” and “international” lines that are included in the measure of diversification employed by 
Berry-Stölzle et al. (2012).  
52 Premiums written across states and territories is obtained from Schedule T of the NAIC Annual Statements. While 
insurers report direct and net premiums written at the business line level, insurers do not report net premiums written 
at the state/territorial level. 
53 As is discussed in Xie et al. (2017), although the U.S. insurance industry is highly regulated, there is no direct 
regulation of insurers’ cash holdings. Instead, regulators impose requirements on insurers’ liquidity, and cash 
holdings are an important component of insurers’ liquid assets.  
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Finally, we control for an insurer’s participation in different business lines by including line 
fixed effects.  
 
Endogeneity 
In our multivariate analysis, we first estimate our baseline model using an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. However, prior literature suggests that market concentration is 
endogenous because market concentration might be jointly determined with firms’ financial 
conditions (e.g., Bajtelsmit and Bouzouita, 1998; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; Shim, 2017). As a 
consequence, the estimation of the OLS regression will be biased and inconsistent. 
Following Shim (2017), we perform a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with 
instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity problem.54 According to Wooldridge (2002), 
successful instrumental variables should satisfy two conditions. The first condition is that the 
instrumental variables must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable. The second 
condition is that the instrumental variables must be uncorrelated with the error term in the 
explanatory equation. Shim (2017) proposes a set of potential candidates for the successful 
instrumental variables. Consistent with Shim (2017), our initial candidates include one-year 
industry growth, average firm size in the previous five years, five-year average growth rate of 
insurers’ net premiums written, and lagged values of independent variables in Equation (1). 
Since we focus on insurers’ state-line market segments and our measures of market 
concentration are insurer-year specific, we adopt a weighted measure for industry growth. 
Specifically, we first calculate the industry growth in each state-line market segment using direct 
premiums written and then weight the growth rates by the proportion of an insurer’s business in 
                                                 
54 The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity and thus suggests a potential endogenous relation 
between cash holdings and market concentration. 
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each segment. To identify the successful instruments, we test instrument relevance by a Wald 
test and instrument validity by a Hansen’s J-test of overidentifying restrictions. We find that the 
state-line weighted one-year industry growth and the average firm size in the previous five years 
satisfy the requirements of both relevancy and validity. 
Following Campa and Kedia (2002), we also attempt to address the endogeneity 
problems using a firm fixed-effects regression. However, our market space weighted 
concentration measures do not have sufficient within-firm variation, hindering the applicability 
of the firm fixed-effects model.55 Thus, we address the panel nature of our data by adjusting the 
standard errors for firm-level clustering. 
 
                                                 
55 For example, the mean and the standard deviation of MS_WCONC (MS_WC4) for Allstate during our sample 
period (1999-2015) are 0.0870 and 0.0017 (0.4983 and 0.0046), respectively. The mean and the standard deviation 
of MS_WCONC (MS_WC4) for State Farm during our sample period are 0.0923 and 0.0010 (0.5078 and 0.0041), 
respectively.  
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Figure 1 
Market Space of Donegal Insurance Group in 2015 
 
 
This figure exhibits the market space of Donegal Insurance Group in 2015. The horizontal axis represents the U.S. states and 
territories. The vertical axis represents the following 22 unique lines of business: farmowners’ multiple peril (1), homeowners’ 
multiple peril (2), mortgage guaranty (3), ocean marine (4), inland marine (5), financial guaranty (6), medical professional liability (7), 
earthquake (8), workers’ compensation (9), products liability (10), aircraft (11), fidelity (12), surety (13), burglary and theft (14), 
boiler and machinery (15), credit (16), other (17), fire and allied lines (18), commercial multiple peril (19), accident and health (20), 
other liability (21), and auto (22). Each dark box represents the presence of Donegal in the corresponding state-line market segment, 
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and each light box represents the absence. Donegal is considered as present in a state-line market segment if it has positive direct 
premiums written in that segment and considered as absent if not.  
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DATA AND SAMPLE 
We obtain an initial sample of U.S. property-liability insurance companies from the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) InfoPro database for the years 1995 
through 2015. Consistent with Shim (2017), we aggregate affiliated insurance companies 56 
because insurers compete with each other at the group level rather than the individual firm level. 
Following Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999), we exclude insurers with non-positive assets, 
capital, net premiums written, or an organizational form other than stock or mutual. Following 
Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015), we also eliminate insurers that report negative cash or negative 
invested assets. Our continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st percentile and the 99th 
percentile to avoid potential bias caused by outliers. Since we require data from the previous five 
years to calculate cash flow volatility, the final sample covers the period 1999 to 2015 and 
consists of a total of 11,225 firm-year observations (1,134 unique firms).  
Table 1 presents variable descriptions and predicted signs for our independent variables 
and Table 2 reports summary statistics. The average cash holdings represent 19.07 percent of 
total invested assets in our sample while the minimum cash holdings are 0.44 percent and the 
maximum cash holdings is 100 percent. Our market space weighted concentration measure 
(MS_WCONC) has a mean of 9.33 percent with a minimum value of 3.17 percent and a 
maximum value of 40.90 percent. The alternative measure of market space weighted 
concentration (MS_WC4) has a mean of 47.20 percent with a minimum value of 25.59 percent
                                                 
56 To avoid double counting of assets when aggregating affiliate-level data, we net out investments in affiliates.  
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and a maximum value of 90.84 percent. In addition, the average insurer in our sample is 
approximately 44 years old, and roughly 7 percent of our sample consists of publicly-traded 
firms. Figure 2 and Figure 3 complement our descriptive statistics by showing the time series of 
industry-wide cash holdings and market concentration in the U.S. property-liability insurance 
industry. Figure 2 shows that cash holdings increased sharply from 1999 through 2003. The size 
of cash holdings in 2003 is almost three times as large as that in 1999. Following the 2008 
financial crisis, cash holdings decreased until 2011. While the amount of cash holdings slightly 
increases following 2011, the percentage of cash holdings remains relatively constant. Figure 3 
exhibits the industry-wide market concentration measured by the Herfindahl index and the four-
firm concentration ratio in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. We find that similar to the time 
trend of cash holdings, market concentration increased significantly in the early 2000s and 
decreased following the financial crisis. 
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Table 1 
Variables and Their Descriptions 
  
Variable Name Variable Description Predicted Sign 
Cash Holdings Measure:   CASH Cash holdings, as measured by the ratio of cash plus short-
term investments to total invested assets.  
   Concentration Measures:   MS_WCONC Market space weighted concentration, as measured by the 
weighted Herfindahl index of direct premiums written in an 
insurer's state-line market space. 
+/- 
MS_WC4 Market space weighted four-firm concentration ratio, as 
measured by the weighted proportion of direct premiums 
written by the largest four insurers in an insurer's state-line 
market space. 
+/- 
   Control Variables:   SIZE Firm size, as measured by the natural logarithm of total net 
admitted assets. - 
FIN_STREN Financial strength, as measured by a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if an insurer does not fail four or more IRIS ratios 
and 0 otherwise. 
- 
GROUP  Group status, as measured by a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 for an affiliated insurer and 0 for an unaffiliated insurer. - 
VOL_CF Volatility of cash flows, as measured by the standard 
deviation of net cash flows from operations over the previous 
five years. 
+ 
DURATION Duration of liabilities, as measured by the weighted average 
duration of liabilities in each line of an insurer. The 
information of duration for each line is obtained from Babbel 
and Klock (1994) and Cummins and Weiss (1991), and the 
average is used if the line is not reported in these two studies. 
The weights are based on insurers' unpaid losses and loss 
adjustment expenses. 
- 
STOCK Organizational form, as measured by a dummy variable that 
is equal to 1 for a stock insurer and 0 for a mutual insurer. +/- 
LEVERAGE Leverage, as measured by the ratio of an insurer's total 
liabilities to total assets. +/- 
INV_OPT Investment opportunity, as measured by the average growth 
in total assets over previous three years. + 
NON_INV_AT Non-invested assets, as measured by the ratio of an insurer's 
total non-invested assets to its total assets. + 
COM_STOCK Common stock holdings, as measured by the ratio of 
common stock holdings to total invested assets. - 
AGE Firm age, as measured by the natural logarithm of the 
difference between an insurer's age and 5 (Hsu, Huang, and 
Lai, 2015). For an insurance group, the age is based on its 
oldest affiliate (Berry-Stözle et al., 2012). 
+ 
DIVIDEND Dividend, as measured by a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 for an insurer that pays a cash dividend to its stockholders 
or policyholders in a year and 0 otherwise. 
- 
PUBLIC Public status, as measured by a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 for a publicly-traded insurer and 0 for a private insurer. +/- 
REINSURANCE Reinsurance ratio, as measured by the ratio of premiums 
ceded to the sum of direct premiums written and reinsurance 
assumed. 
- 
CATASTROPHE Catastrophe risk, as measured by the percentage of direct + 
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premiums written that are in property lines in coastal areas. 
LINES_DIV Business line diversification, as measured by the complement 
of the Herfindahl index of net premiums written across all 
business lines. 
- 
GEO_DIV Geographic diversification, as measured by the complement 
of the Herfindahl index of direct premiums written across all 
U.S. states and territories 
- 
This table presents the variables, their descriptions, and predicted signs in the multivariate 
regressions. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Name N Mean Median Min Max 
Std. 
Dev. 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Dependent Variable: 
        CASH 11,225 0.1907 0.0969 0.0044 1.0000 0.2332 0.0475 0.2267 
         Concentration Measures: 
        MS_WCONC 11,225 0.0933 0.0786 0.0317 0.4090 0.0577 0.0636 0.0993 
MS_WC4 11,225 0.4720 0.4593 0.2559 0.9084 0.1120 0.4006 0.5197 
         Control Variables: 
        SIZE 11,225 18.1220 17.8477 13.2494 24.2135 2.3418 16.3713 19.6512 
FIN_STREN 11,225 0.8697 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3367 1.0000 1.0000 
GROUP  11,225 0.3263 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4689 0.0000 1.0000 
VOL_CF 11,225 0.0589 0.0410 0.0056 0.3349 0.0555 0.0237 0.0731 
DURATION 11,225 1.7453 1.5731 0.6400 4.9900 0.8504 1.4100 1.8035 
STOCK 11,225 0.5294 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4992 0.0000 1.0000 
LEVERAGE 11,225 0.5444 0.5802 0.0077 0.9178 0.1992 0.4293 0.6892 
INV_OPT 11,225 0.0690 0.0519 -0.2269 0.7405 0.1222 0.0083 0.1054 
NON_INV_AT 11,225 0.1494 0.1297 0.0000 0.6561 0.1146 0.0689 0.1977 
COM_STOCK 11,225 0.1206 0.0742 -0.0011 0.7005 0.1461 0.0030 0.1732 
AGE 11,225 3.6529 3.9318 0.0000 6.9470 1.2074 2.8904 4.6821 
DIVIDEND 11,225 0.3919 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4882 0.0000 1.0000 
PUBLIC 11,225 0.0728 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2598 0.0000 0.0000 
REINSURANCE 11,225 0.2226 0.1556 0.0000 0.9197 0.2157 0.0621 0.3198 
CATASTROPHE 11,225 0.1276 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2261 0.0000 0.1533 
LINES_DIV 11,225 0.3585 0.4112 0.0000 0.8443 0.3052 0.0000 0.6514 
GEO_DIV 11,225 0.3458 0.1594 0.0000 0.9576 0.3767 0.0000 0.7410 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables in the cash holdings regression. The 
variables are defined in Table 1. The data is obtained from the NAIC (National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners) InfoPro database for the years from 1995 through 2015. Affiliated 
insurers are aggregated at the group level and continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. The final sample for the cash holdings regression covers the years from 1999 
through 2015 and consists of 11,225 firm-year observations. 
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Figure 2 
Industry-Wide Cash Holdings in the U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry 
 
 
This figure exhibits the industry-wide cash holdings in the U.S. property-liability insurance 
industry from 1999 through 2015. The horizontal axis represents the year. The primary vertical 
axis (on the left) represents the industry-wide amount of cash holdings (billion), and the 
secondary vertical axis (on the right) represents the industry-wide percentage of cash holdings 
(%). The industry-wide percentage of cash holdings is calculated as the ratio of the industry’s 
total cash plus short-term investments to the industry’s total invested assets. The bar and the line 
depicts the industry-wide amount and the percentage of cash holdings, respectively. 
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Figure 3 
Industry-Wide Market Concentration in the U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry 
 
 
This figure exhibits the industry-wide market concentration in the U.S. property-liability 
insurance industry from 1999 through 2015. The horizontal axis represents the year. The vertical 
axis represents the industry-wide market concentration. The industry-wide market concentration 
is measured by the Herfindahl index (CONC) and the 4-firm concentration ratio (C4) in Panel A 
and Panel B, respectively. 
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UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Prior to testing our hypotheses using a multivariate approach, we first examine the 
relation between cash holdings and market concentration in a univariate setting. Table 3 
compares cash holdings between insurers that are exposed to high market concentration and 
insurers that are exposed to low market concentration. Market concentration is measured by 
MS_WCONC and MS_WC4 in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. We classify market 
concentration as high if the market concentration is above the median and as low if the market 
concentration is below the median. We find that insurers exposed to high market concentration 
hold more cash than those exposed to low market concentration, and that the difference in cash 
holdings (both mean and median) is statistically significant. In Panel A, mean cash holdings of 
insurers that face high market concentration is 19.48 percent while insurers that face low market 
concentration have average cash holdings of 18.64 percent. These univariate results hold when 
we use the alternative measure of market concentration (MS_WC4) in Panel B. Overall, the 
univariate comparisons presented in Table 3 provide initial evidence of a positive relation 
between market concentration and cash holdings which is consistent with the predation risk 
theory. 
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Table 3 
Univariate Comparison 
 
Variable 
  
High 
Concentration 
(1) 
Low 
Concentration 
(2) 
Difference  
(3) = (1) - (2) 
p-value 
(4) 
t-statistic 
(5) 
Panel A: High Concentration > Median of MS_WCONC and Low Concentration < Median of 
MS_WCONC 
CASH Mean 0.1949 0.1864 0.0085 0.05 1.93 
 
Median 0.0982 0.0957 0.0025 0.04 
   N 5,612 5,612       
Panel B: High Concentration > Median of MS_WC4 and Low Concentration < Median of 
MS_WC4 
CASH Mean 0.2026 0.1787 0.0239 0.00 5.45 
 
Median 0.1014 0.0927 0.0086 0.00 
   N 5,612 5,612       
This table compares the cash holdings between insurers that are exposed to high market 
concentration and insurers that are exposed to low market concentration. The market 
concentration is measured by MS_WCONC and MS_WC4 in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. 
MS_WCONC and MS_WC4 are defined in Table 1. The market concentration is classified as 
high or low based on its median. The significance of differences in means is tested by a t-test. 
The significance of differences in medians is tested by a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
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MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Table 4 presents results of multivariate regressions of cash holdings on market space 
concentration using both an ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
approach. The first and the second columns in the table present the results when using 
MS_WCONC as the key independent variable, and the third and the fourth columns present the 
results when we use MS_WC4 as the key independent variable. The fifth column contains the 
results reported by Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999) for comparative purposes. We find 
that the coefficient on MS_WCONC is positive and statistically significant in both the OLS and 
the 2SLS regressions. Alternatively, when we use MS_WC4 as our market concentration 
measure, the coefficient is still positive and statistically significant in both regressions. The 
results suggest that increased market concentration is associated with greater insurer cash 
holdings. Similar to our findings in the univariate analysis, this result is consistent with the 
predation risk theory of cash holdings (Hypothesis 1). 
The results presented in Table 4 are largely consistent with those of Colquitt, Sommer 
and Godwin (1999) (hereafter CSG) with only a few exceptions. First, the group status (GROUP) 
variable is positively related to cash holdings in our 2SLS models but is inversely related to cash 
holdings in the CSG (1999) study. Given that our study aggregates firms at the group level while 
their study does not, one potential explanation for this difference is that that even though the 
individual insurers in the group hold less cash because of the liquidity help from other affiliated 
insurers, the group, as a whole, needs to hold more cash to fulfill the demand of its members for
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liquidity.57 Second, CSG (1999) find that the coefficients on investment opportunity (INV_OPT) 
and non-invested assets (NON_INV_AT) are not statistically significant. However, we find 
significant relations, and the signs of these two variables are consistent with the initial 
expectations stated in CSG (1999). Beyond the aforementioned differences, all other results 
presented in Table 4 are consistent with CSG (1999).  
As a robustness check, we also follow Xie, et al. (2017) and use the natural logarithm of 
cash holdings as the dependent variable. The results are reported in the last four columns. We 
find that they are qualitatively similar to the results when the dependent variable is cash holdings. 
                                                 
57 Similar to our results, Che and Liebenberg (2017) also provide some evidence that insurance groups have greater 
cash holdings relative to unaffiliated insurers.  
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Table 4 
Effects of Market Concentration on Cash Holdings 
 Dependent Variable: CASH   Ln(CASH) 
  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS CSG (1999)   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
INTERCEPT 1.0713*** 1.0979*** 1.0326*** 0.9498*** 0.5929*** 
 
2.3016*** 2.4364*** 2.1558*** 1.7744*** 
 
(0.0884) (0.0911) (0.0887) (0.1040) (0.0001) 
 
(0.3412) (0.3439) (0.3389) (0.3645) 
MS_WCONC 0.2045* 0.5916* 
    
0.7525* 2.7125*** 
  
 
(0.1064) (0.3173) 
    
(0.3947) (0.7487) 
  MS_WC4 
  
0.1067* 0.4655* 
    
0.4077* 2.0603*** 
   
(0.0552) (0.2478) 
    
(0.2174) (0.5913) 
SIZE -0.0461*** -0.0496*** -0.0455*** -0.0493*** -0.0189*** 
 
-0.2659*** -0.2832*** -0.2636*** -0.2813*** 
 
(0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0202) (0.0215) (0.0200) (0.0216) 
FIN_STREN -0.0552*** -0.0542*** -0.0552*** -0.0532*** -0.0180*** 
 
-0.2344*** -0.2293*** -0.2341*** -0.2249*** 
 
(0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0100) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0413) (0.0419) (0.0413) (0.0427) 
GROUP 0.0194 0.0210* 0.0190 0.0204* -0.0432*** 
 
0.1197* 0.1278* 0.1181* 0.1247* 
 
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0668) (0.0673) (0.0668) (0.0681) 
VOL_CF 0.4731*** 0.4489*** 0.4767*** 0.4459*** 0.1333*** 
 
2.3565*** 2.2341*** 2.3685*** 2.2266*** 
 
(0.0881) (0.0895) (0.0881) (0.0903) (0.0351) 
 
(0.3268) (0.3345) (0.3267) (0.3389) 
DURATION -0.0172** -0.0256** -0.0177** -0.0344** -0.0213*** 
 
-0.0513 -0.0939** -0.0540 -0.1311*** 
 
(0.0086) (0.0106) (0.0087) (0.0142) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0401) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0459) 
STOCK 0.0225* 0.0198* 0.0227* 0.0185 0.0558*** 
 
0.1475*** 0.1340** 0.1480*** 0.1288** 
 
(0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0001) 
 
(0.0531) (0.0531) (0.0532) (0.0543) 
LEVERAGE -0.1455*** -0.1390*** -0.1475*** -0.1425*** -0.0356* 
 
-0.3852** -0.3522** -0.3922** -0.3692** 
 
(0.0394) (0.0396) (0.0395) (0.0402) (0.0888) 
 
(0.1639) (0.1660) (0.1642) (0.1695) 
INV_OPT 0.1088*** 0.1157*** 0.1077*** 0.1161*** 0.0054 
 
0.6286*** 0.6635*** 0.6247*** 0.6638*** 
 
(0.0307) (0.0314) (0.0307) (0.0315) (0.5126) 
 
(0.1265) (0.1284) (0.1265) (0.1287) 
NON_INV_AT 0.1018* 0.1096* 0.1004* 0.1096* 0.0229 
 
0.6479*** 0.6872*** 0.6432*** 0.6853*** 
 
(0.0556) (0.0560) (0.0555) (0.0563) (0.4459) 
 
(0.2016) (0.2039) (0.2014) (0.2054) 
COM_STOCK -0.2861*** -0.2889*** -0.2865*** -0.2929*** -0.1753*** 
 
-0.9742*** -0.9884*** -0.9759*** -1.0052*** 
 
(0.0349) (0.0356) (0.0349) (0.0367) (0.0001) 
 
(0.1631) (0.1649) (0.1631) (0.1673) 
AGE 0.0041 0.0038 0.0037 0.0022 
  
0.0061 0.0049 0.0049 -0.0020 
 
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0065) 
  
(0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0263) 
DIVIDEND 0.0069 0.0075 0.0073 0.0098 
  
-0.0097 -0.0066 -0.0081 0.0033 
 
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0098) 
  
(0.0472) (0.0472) (0.0472) (0.0473) 
PUBLIC 0.0048 0.0108 0.0044 0.0139 
  
-0.0508 -0.0204 -0.0517 -0.0083 
 
(0.0125) (0.0136) (0.0124) (0.0143) 
  
(0.0868) (0.0888) (0.0865) (0.0902) 
REINSURANCE 0.0623** 0.0634** 0.0644** 0.0731** 
  
0.4299*** 0.4353*** 0.4378*** 0.4783*** 
 
(0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0298) 
  
(0.1098) (0.1096) (0.1095) (0.1116) 
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CATASTROPHE 0.0496 0.0484 0.0481 0.0412 
  
0.1186 0.1126 0.1130 0.0810 
 
(0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0308) 
  
(0.1225) (0.1225) (0.1227) (0.1244) 
LINES_DIV -0.0986*** -0.1030*** -0.0977*** -0.1025*** 
  
-0.3685** -0.3907*** -0.3654** -0.3875*** 
 
(0.0292) (0.0301) (0.0292) (0.0307) 
  
(0.1439) (0.1457) (0.1438) (0.1476) 
GEO_DIV -0.0507** -0.0447** -0.0506** -0.0397* 
  
-0.1218 -0.0914 -0.1210 -0.0705 
 
(0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0206) (0.0225) 
  
(0.1078) (0.1100) (0.1076) (0.1128) 
Wald Test Statistics 
 
5.6110*** 
 
3.7270** 
   
5.6110*** 
 
3.7270** 
Hansen's J Statistics 
 
0.5421 
 
0.5957 
   
0.8680 
 
0.8353 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Line Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.3807 0.3745 0.3807 0.3616 0.2224 
 
0.4105 0.4041 0.4106 0.3943 
Observations 11,225 11,225 11,225 11,225    11,225 11,225 11,225 11,225 
This table presents the multivariate regressions of cash holdings on market concentration. The dependent variables are cash holdings 
(CASH) and its natural logarithm (Ln(CASH)). The variables are defined in Table 1. OLS is an ordinary least squares regression. 
2SLS is a two-stage least squares regression. Instruments include state-line weighted one-year industry growth and average firm size 
in the previous five years. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level. The column labeled “CGS 
(1999)” presents the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) reported by Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999). *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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FUTURE GROWTH 
In the previous section, we found that insurers tend to hold more cash if they underwrite 
in more concentrated markets. However, it is still unclear whether the excess cash holdings are 
used to hedge predation risk. By definition, predation risk refers to “the risk of underinvestment 
leading to a loss of investment opportunities and market share to product market rivals” 
(Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2007). Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015) provide an approach to 
examine whether a higher level of cash holdings is used to prevent the underinvestment problem. 
We follow their approach and provide evidence from the perspective of insurers’ future growth. 
Following Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015), we employ the average growth rate of direct 
premiums written for the following three years as the proxy for future growth and use the 
decomposed excess cash holdings interacted with market concentration as the key variables to 
test whether a higher level of cash holdings is used to hedge predation risk. Excess cash holdings 
(EX_CASH) are defined as the difference between the actual cash holdings and the target cash 
holdings. The target cash holdings are estimated by either the regression model specified by CSG 
(1999) with year dummies or a Fama-MacBeth model with variables specified in the CSG.58 
Following Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015), we call the excess cash holdings “positive excess cash 
                                                 
58 The Fama-MacBeth model treats each year as an independent cross-section and gives the average of the time 
series of coefficients from annual cross-sectional regressions. We also check the robustness of our results by using 
an alternative specification of variables in calculating the target cash holdings. Specifically, we use the variables in 
our full specification (excluding the market concentration measures) in Table 4 to estimate the target level of cash 
holdings. The target cash holdings are estimated by either the full specification model with year dummies or the 
Fama-MacBeth model with variables specified in the full specification model. We reproduce our results in our 
study. In unreported tables, we find that our results are robust to this alternative estimation of the target cash 
holdings. 
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holdings” if the excess cash holdings are positive and “negative excess cash holdings” if the 
excess cash holdings are negative. The method used to calculate the decomposed variables is 
consistent with Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Wruck (1989). Specifically, we create 
two excess cash holdings variables, where the positive (negative) excess cash holdings variable 
is equal to a firm’s excess cash holdings if cash holdings are greater than or equal to (less than) 
zero and otherwise the variable is equal to zero. Following Hsu, Huang, and Lai (2015), we 
control for firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), line-of-business diversification (LINES_DIV), and 
geographic diversification (GEO_DIV) in our models.  
Table 5 presents the multivariate regressions of future growth on market space 
concentration.  It shows that the coefficient on the interaction term between negative excess cash 
and market concentration (EX_CASH(negative)×MS_WCONC or EX_CASH(negative)×MS_WC4) is 
positive and significant, while the coefficient on the interaction term between positive excess 
cash and market concentration (EX_CASH(positive)×MS_WCONC or EX_CASH(positive)×MS_WC4) 
is statistically insignificant. These results provide evidence in support of H1.1 (Predation Risk 
Hypothesis). Specifically, an increase in cash holdings leads to faster future growth when market 
concentration is higher. We note that this relation is statistically significant only when cash 
holdings are below the target level and that the significance vanishes when cash holdings are 
above the target level, implying that holding too much cash is not optimal. Similar results are 
also obtained when the Fama-MacBeth model is used to estimate the target cash holdings. 
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Table 5 
Effects of Market Concentration and Excess Cash Holdings on Future Growth 
 Dependent Variable: DPW_GROWTH 
Target Cash Holdings Model: 
CSG Model 
with 
Year Dummies 
 
Fama-MacBeth Model 
with CSG 
Variables 
  OLS OLS   OLS OLS 
INTERCEPT 0.2933*** 0.3033*** 
 
0.2918*** 0.3008*** 
 
(0.0541) (0.0536) 
 
(0.0542) (0.0540) 
EX_CASH -0.0432 -0.1213 
 
-0.0410 -0.1145 
 
(0.0362) (0.0799) 
 
(0.0365) (0.0805) 
EX_CASH(positive)×MS_WCONC 0.1648 
  
0.1683 
 
 
(0.3998) 
  
(0.4028) 
 EX_CASH(negative)×MS_WCONC 1.4279** 
  
1.3353** 
 
 
(0.5827) 
  
(0.5958) 
 EX_CASH(positive)×MS_WC4 
 
0.1852 
  
0.1781 
  
(0.1709) 
  
(0.1712) 
EX_CASH(negative)×MS_WC4 
 
0.4562** 
  
0.4247** 
  
(0.2005) 
  
(0.2039) 
MS_WCONC -0.0328 
  
-0.0352 
 
 
(0.0724) 
  
(0.0713) 
 MS_WC4 
 
-0.0112 
  
-0.0114 
  
(0.0390) 
  
(0.0388) 
SIZE -0.0061* -0.0067** 
 
-0.0060* -0.0065** 
 
(0.0033) (0.0033) 
 
(0.0033) (0.0033) 
AGE -0.0098** -0.0095** 
 
-0.0098** -0.0095** 
 
(0.0046) (0.0047) 
 
(0.0046) (0.0047) 
LINES_DIV 0.0208 0.0185 
 
0.0211 0.0188 
 
(0.0251) (0.0251) 
 
(0.0251) (0.0251) 
GEO_DIV 0.0310 0.0307 
 
0.0307 0.0305 
 
(0.0202) (0.0200) 
 
(0.0202) (0.0200) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Line Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.0800 0.0796 
 
0.0799 0.0793 
Observations 8,192 8,192  8,192 8,192 
This table presents the multivariate regressions of future growth on market concentration. The 
dependent variable is the future growth (DPW_GROWTH), calculated as the average growth 
rate of direct premiums written for the following three years. The excess cash holdings 
(EX_CASH) are calculated as the difference between the actual cash holdings and the target cash 
holdings. The target cash holdings are estimated by either the regression model specified by 
Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin (1999) (CSG) with year dummies or the Fama-MacBeth model 
with variables specified in the CSG. EX_CASH(positive)= 0 if EX_CASH < 0; EX_CASH(positive)= 
EX_CASH if EX_CASH >= 0. EX_CASH(negative)= EX_CASH if EX_CASH < 0; 
EX_CASH(negative)= 0 if EX_CASH >= 0. All remaining variables are defined in Table 1. OLS is 
an ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering 
at the insurer level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
The predation risk theory and the financial constraint-based theory yield competing 
predictions on the relation between market concentration and corporate cash holdings policy. 
Taking advantage of the detailed data reported by firms in the U.S. property-liability insurance 
industry, we investigate the relation between cash holdings policy and market concentration. In 
this study, we propose a measure for market concentration, market space weighted concentration, 
which we contend more accurately reflects an insurer’s state-line market space. Through our 
empirical analysis, we find that market concentration is positively related to cash holdings, 
which supports the predation risk theory. Furthermore, we show that an increase in cash holdings 
leads to insurers’ faster future growth when market concentration is higher, which provides 
further support for predation risk theory. While the results indicate that the marginal benefit of 
cash holdings increases with market concentration, we find that the effect only exists when cash 
holdings are below the target level, which implies that holding too much cash is not optimal - 
even in a more concentrated market.  
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